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AUTHORSHIP, AUDIENCES, AND
ANONYMOUS SPEECH
Lyrissa Barnett Lidshy*
Thomas F. Cottert
Thence comes it that my name receives a brand,
And almost thence my nature is subdu'd
To what it works in, like the dyer's hand.
-William Shakespeare, Sonnet 1111
INTRODUCTION
What's in a name? Audiences often rely on author identity to
reduce the search costs involved in sorting and interpreting the con-
stant barrage of messages they receive. 2 Yet the First Amendment, as
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1 WILLM A SRAKESPEARE, Sonnets (London 1609), in THE RrVERSIDE SHARESPEARE
1863 (2d ed. 1997).
2 For recent discussions of authorial attribution and its relation to trademark
law, see Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law & Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO.
L.J. 49 (2006); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author's Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective
on the Moral Right of "Paternity"?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 379 (2005); Laura A.
Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80
NOTR DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005); Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Author-
ship, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1171 (2005); see also infra Part II.A (discussing the effects autho-
rial attribution can have on the credibility of speech). In face-to-face
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interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, confers upon
authors a right to speak anonymously or pseudonymously, even when
doing so interferes with audiences' attempts to decode their
messages.3 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,4 the Supreme
Court emphasized the contributions anonymous speakers have made
to public discourse and held that the State cannot punish citizens for
pseudonymous publication of handbills concerning a ballot initiative. 5
But this right to speak anonymously is not absolute. In McConnell v.
FEC,6 the Court emphasized the dangers of anonymous speech and
qualified the right to speak anonymously, though none too explicitly,
by upholding a statutory provision requiring persons who purchase
television advertisements advocating for or against a candidate for fed-
eral office to disclose their identities. 7
These decisions, and the handful of others addressing anony-
mous speech," provide insufficient guidance to lower courts dealing
with the growing problem of malfeasance by anonymous speakers
online,9 and with the growing threat frivolous lawsuits pose to legiti-
mate anonymous speech.10 Although speech emanating from uniden-
communications, the communicative impact of identity is even greater: an audience
will rely on the speaker's posture, dress, body language, and facial expressions to
gauge the sincerity and credibility of her message. See, e.g., ERVING GOFEMAN, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY Lien 249 (1959) ("Underlying all social interaction
there seems to be a fundamental dialectic. When one individual enters the presence
of others, he will want to discover the facts of the situations .... Full information of
this order is rarely available; in its absence, the individual tends to employ substi-
tutes-cues, tests, hints, expressive gestures, status symbols, etc.-as predictive
devices.").
3 Throughout this Article, we generally use the term "anonymous" to refer to
both anonymous and pseudonymous speech-that is, to speech by an author whose
identity is unknown, whether or not that identity is ultimately traceable. See L. Det-
weiler, Identity, Privacy, and Anonymity on the Internet § 3.1 (1993), http://www.rewi.hu-
berlin.de/jura/proj/dsi/Netze/privint.html ("anonymity is the absence of identity").
4 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
5 Id. at 341-42.
6 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
7 Id. at 128.
8 See infra note 13.
9 A USA Today article reports that in the last two years, "more than 50 lawsuits
stemming from postings on blogs and website message boards have been filed across
the nation." Laura Parker, Courts Are Asked to Crack Down on Bloggers, Websites, USA
TODAY, Oct. 3, 2006, at Al.
10 The growth is largely attributable to the Internet, which has made anonymous
speech much more common. See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:
Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DuKE L.J. 855, 860 (2000) (noting that the
Internet "empowers ordinary individuals with limited financial resources to 'publish'
their views on matters of public concern"). A new category of lawsuits against anony-
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tifiable sources contributes to the diversity, quantity, and quality of
voices in the marketplace of ideas, I anonymity can also shield speak-
ers from liability for a variety of torts, including defamation, invasion
of privacy, fraud, copyright infringement, and trade secret misappro-
priation. A relatively "strong" right to speak anonymously therefore
may induce more "core" First Amendment speech while enabling
more tortfeasors to avoid detection; on the other hand, a weak or non-
existent right to speak anonymously would tend to chill core speech
but also render more tortfeasors amenable to legal process.
This Article aims to assist lawmakers and courts to find the proper
balance between the right to speak without disclosing one's true iden-
tity and the rights of those injured by anonymous speech. To this
end, we present both a positive and a normative analysis of anony-
mous speech. In the positive analysis, we examine the private costs
and benefits that speakers encounter when deciding whether to pub-
lish with or without attribution; among these costs and benefits are
the potentially differing responses of audiences to attributed and
nonattributed speech. For example, speakers may feel less vulnerable
to retaliation when they speak anonymously, and thus may be more
apt both to speak truthfully and to engage in tortious or harmful
speech. At the same time, audiences are likely to discount the value of
nonattributed speech, thus mitigating some (but not all) of anony-
mous speech's potential harm.12 In theory, audiences could be either
mous online speakers has garnered the label "cyberSLAPP" from those who see the
suits as frivolous; people who tend to view them favorably refer to the speech at issue
as "cybersmears." Compare Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits and John Doe Subpoenas:
Balancing Anonymity and Accountability in Cyberspace, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 493, 498 (2001) ("[Dlespite some valid claims, many legal experts and pri-
vacy advocates claim that companies are abusing the legal process simply to 'out' their
online critics."), with Thomas G. Ciarlone, Jr. & Eric W. Wiechmann, Cybersmear May
Be Coming to a Web Site Near You: A Primer for Corporate Victims, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 51, 52
(2003) ("Companies that try to curb the dissemination of misinformation are improp-
erly cast as corporate bullies. Quite the contrary. These companies are honoring
their obligation to shareholders to attend to matters that jeopardize reputation,
brand name, and thus profitability.").
11 We concede at the outset that the "marketplace" metaphor has its limitations.
AsJeffrey Stake notes, however, in spite of criticism the metaphor "will likely persist as
a normative framework for analyzing First Amendment issues until we find a better
model." Jeffrey Evans Stake, Are We Buyers or Hosts? A Memetic Approach to the First
Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REv. 1213, 1214 (2001). And we do think that the metaphor,
hackneyed and incomplete as it may be, captures some key (albeit contestable)
assumptions underlying current First Amendment law. See generally infra Part III.B
(discussing assumptions underlying First Amendment doctrine).
12 As we will show, when speech is completely anonymous, rational audiences can
be expected to take the lack of an attributed source into consideration in assessing
1539
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better or worse off under a regime that grants strong protection to
anonymous speech, as opposed to one that grants only weak protec-
tion, depending upon which effect-the production of more socially
valuable speech, or the production of more harmful, though dis-
counted, speech-predominates. Put another way, speakers' pursuit
of the optimal balance of private costs and benefits in a regime that
protects anonymity may produce outcomes that diverge from the opti-
mal balance of social costs and benefits, as viewed from the standpoint
of the audience. The extent of the divergence is unclear, however,
and thus the implications of the positive analysis standing alone are
indeterminate.
Our normative analysis nevertheless suggests a way of resolving
this indeterminacy. Traditional First Amendment theory suggests two
presumptions that can assist in weighing the relevant costs and bene-
fits of anonymous speech. The first is that the audience for "core"
First Amendment speech is both educated and critical-and thus able
to defend itself, in large part, from the effects of harmful anonymous
speech. 13 This presumption is not empirically based, to be sure, but it
is consonant with versions of democratic theory that assume that citi-
zens are rational and capable of self-government. The second is that
more speech is, in general, better than less, and therefore that mea-
sures designed to reduce the quantity or diversity of speech are inher-
ently suspect. To the extent the anonymity option makes otherwise
reluctant speakers more willing to speak, therefore, it is presumptively
a social good, despite some risk that it will induce some harmful
speech as well. Taking these assumptions as touchstones, we advocate
(in the context of claims involving torts such as defamation) a consti-
tutional privilege for anonymous speech, which privilege may be over-
come only when the party seeking disclosure of the speaker's identity
the speech's quality and truth value. On the other hand, when the speaker uses a
pseudonym, audiences may not discount the value of the speech very much, perhaps
because they are not aware that the author's name is a pseudonym. But even when
audiences are made aware of this fact, they may (rationally) choose not to discount
pseudonymous speech as much as anonymous speech, on the assumption that the
pseudonymous author's identity is known to what Saul Levmore refers to as a "respon-
sible intermediary." See Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191,
2202 (1996). Audiences might also discount pseudonymous speech less because
pseudonyms sometimes serve a trademark-like function of signaling a degree of qual-
ity control. See Heymann, supra note 2, at 1419; Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1194.
13 The Supreme Court has been willing to indulge more paternalistic assump-
tions about the audience in the context of commercial speech. Consumer protection
is an accepted rationale for regulating commercial speech. See, e.g., Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (noting that commercial speech may
be regulated to ensure that it is not false and misleading).
[VOL. 82:41540
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presents sufficient evidence from which the trier 
of fact may conclude
that the speaker has committed the tort at issue, and 
that disclosure of
that person's identity is essential to the alleged 
victim's case. Laws
requiring disclosure in the context of political 
speech, on the other
hand, should be (if anything) even more difficult to justify; 
in the con-
text of commercial speech, however, the assumption 
of a rational, crit-
ical audience may give way to more paternalistic 
assumptions and thus
make it relatively easy for the state to compel 
disclosure.
Part I inspects the unstable foundation upon 
which the Supreme
Court has grounded the right to speak anonymously 
in cases such as
McIntyre and McConnell. Part II presents the positive 
analysis of the
private and public costs and benefits of anonymous 
speech referred to
above. Among other things, this Part makes 
use of concepts from the
law of intellectual property (particularly trademarks and 
copyright) to
illuminate some recurring problems surrounding 
the publication of
anonymous speech. Part III makes the case 
that our two presump-
tions, of rational audiences and more-is-better, 
are firmly grounded in
conventional First Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV employs 
the
positive and normative analyses of anonymous 
speech to provide gui-
dance to legislatures attempting to curb anonymous 
speech (particu-
larly anonymous speech online) and to courts adjudicating 
cases that
present conflicts between the right to speak 
anonymously and other
important interests.
I. THE MANY FACES OF A oNmnayM
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment 
protects
anonymous speech, but the scope of that protection 
is murky. The
two main decisions, McIntyre and McConnell, 
rely on conflicting
assumptions about how audiences respond to anonymous 
or pseudon-
ymous speech and, ultimately, conflicting assumptions 
about its value.
The Court's jurisprudence has thus generated conflicting approaches
to balancing such speech against other important 
rights.
A. McIntyre and the Contributions of Anonymous Speech
The leading Supreme Court case on anonymous 
speech is McIn-
tyre.14 Margaret McIntyre wrote handbills opposing 
a school tax refer-
14 514 U.S. 334 (1995). Three other cases deal direcdy 
with anonymous speech.
In Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village 
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002), the Court addressed the constitutionality of an ordinance 
prohibiting door-to-
door canvassing without a permit from the 
mayor's office. The Court struck down the
ordinance on the grounds that it was overbroad 
and not sufficiently tailored to the
interests of preventing fraud and crime 
and protecting privacy. Id. at 168-69. The
2007]
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endum and then handed them out to people attending public
meetings to discuss the tax. She omitted her name from some of the
handbills, instead signing them: "'CONCERNED PARENTS AND
TAX PAYERS [sici .' ,5 Responding to a complaint from a school offi-
cial, the Ohio Elections Commission fined McIntyre $100 for violating
an Ohio law forbidding distribution of any publication promoting a
ballot issue unless it contained the "name and residence" of the per-
son "who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor[el."' 6 McIntyre
appealed, and the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Ohio law did
not violate the First Amendment, since the minor burden on speakers
posed by the law was more than offset by the state interest in helping
voters assess the "validity" of campaign literature and "identify[ing]
those who engage in fraud, libel or false advertising."17 The Supreme
Court struck down the Ohio law on a 7-2 vote, with Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting. The Court held that "an author's
decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omis-
sions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.""'
The Court rested its decision on two grounds. The first ground
was instrumental: Protecting anonymity is necessary to induce some
authors to contribute valuable information to the marketplace of
ideas. The Court lauded the contributions anonymous and pseudony-
mous authors have made to the "progress of mankind,"1 9 citing politi-
cal examples such as the Federalist Papers and literary examples such as
Court cited McIntyre for the proposition that the permit requirement would have a
.pernicious effect" in part because it "necessarily results in a surrender of... anonym-
ity." Id. at 166; see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182,
199-200 (1999) (striking down state law requiring people circulating petitions deal-
ing with issue referenda to wear identification badges); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 428-29 (1963) (recognizing a right to anonymous association); Talley v. Califor-
nia, 362 U.S. 60, 80 (1960) (striking down a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited all
anonymous handbilling and holding that Los Angeles could employ means less
restrictive of freedom of expression in protecting its citizens from fraud).
15 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337.
16 Id. at 338 & n.3.
17 Id. at 340.
18 Id. at 342; see Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the
Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 120 (1996) (arguing that the Court treated "anonymity as
the speaker's rightful choice" in McIntyre).
19 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas cited historical
examples to show that the Framers believed in protecting anonymous speech. Id. at
370 (Thomas, J, concurring). He concluded: "[Wlhether certain types of expression
have 'value' today has little significance; what is important is whether the Framers in
1791 believed anonymous speech sufficiently valuable to deserve the protection of the
Bill of Rights." Id.
(VOL. 82:41542
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Mark Twain and George Eliot.
2 0 The Court's opinion focused on
benign reasons motivating speakers to remain 
anonymous: fear of
retaliation or reprisal, the desire to avoid social ostracism, 
the wish to
protect privacy, 21 or the fear that the audience's 
biases will distort the
meaning of the work.2
2 The Court grandiloquently concluded that
"[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority"
23 without
which public discourse would certainly suffer.
The Court's second ground for protecting anonymous 
speech
was authorial autonomy. An author's decision to 
remain anonymous is
an exercise of autonomy over choice of content, 
and "an author gen-
erally is free to decide whether or not to disclose 
his or her true iden-
tity."24 The Court labeled identification requirements 
"intrusive"
because they require authors to reveal "the 
content of [their]
thoughts on a controversial issue."
25 In essence, the Court treated the
decision to rem~iin anonymous as an editorial 
judgment like any
other, which makes choosing to omit one's name 
no different than
choosing to omit an opposing viewpoint or to 
include serial commas.
Once the Court equated the author's name with 
all other edito-
rial content, the outcome of McIntyre was clear. 
If an author's name is
.content," it logically follows that the statute in McIntyre was a content-
based regulation. The statute required particular 
content (i.e., the
author's name) to be included in an author's work.
26 Moreover, the
statute's application was triggered only by publications 
that dealt with
particular subjects (ballot issues or candidates)
.27 Ultimately, how-
ever, Ohio's content-based disclosure requirement 
was unconstitu-
tional only because it regulated speech at "the 
core of the protection
afforded by the First Amendment.
28 Handbills that seek to influence
"issue-based elections" are "political speech" 
entitled to every bit as
much First Amendment protection as speech advocating 
the election
20 Id. at 341 n.4 (majority opinion).
21 Id. at 341-42. The Court further noted 
that the right may be particularly
important for "persecuted groups" who criticize 
oppressive practices. Id. at 342.
22 Id. at 342 n.5.
23 Id. at 357. Indeed, the Court concluded that 
protection of anonymity is there-
fore consistent with the "purpose behind the 
Bill of Rights, and of the First Amend-
ment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals 
from retaliation-and their ideas
from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant 
society." Id.
24 Id. at 341.
25 Id. at 355.
26 Id. at 338 n.3 (citing OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 
3599.09(A) (West 1988)
(amended and recodified at § 3517.20 in 1995)).
27 Oulo REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1988) (amended 
and recodified at
§ 3517.20 in 1995).
28 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-46.
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of a candidate.29 Indeed, the Court asserted that "[n]o form of
speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than Mrs.
McIntyre's.""o
A content-based regulation of core political speech almost never
survives strict scrutiny, and the regulation in McIntyre was no excep-
tion. The Court rejected Ohio's assertions that the regulation was
necessary to "provid[e] the electorate with relevant information" and
to prevent fraud and libel.31 The Court saw no reason to think that
McIntyre's handbill was misleading, essentially glossing over the impli-
cation that others supported the arguments made in the handbill. 32
Moreover, the Court did not think that McIntyre's name was likely to
be useful to the electorate in evaluating her message, noting that the
name of the author of a "handbill written by a private citizen who is
not known to the recipient" is likely to "add little, if anything, to the
reader's ability to evaluate the document's message." 33 The mere pos-
sibility that an author's name might, in some cases, "buttress or under-
mine the argument in a document" was insufficient.34 The Court also
rejected as insufficient Ohio's second asserted interest-the "ancillary
benefit" of deterring and detecting fraud and libel.35 Although the
Court believed that this interest "carries special weight during election
campaigns," it found that the interest could be protected effectively
through direct prohibitions on fraud and libel.36
Despite the Court's praise of anonymous speech throughout
McIntyre, the opinion acknowledges that First Amendment protection
is not absolute.3 7 The Court envisions a balancing process to ensure
that speakers remain accountable for fraud, libel, or other unlawful
acts. Indeed, dictum in McIntyre suggests several types of identifica-
tion requirements that might survive constitutional scrutiny.3 These
include requirements applicable "only to the activities of candidates
29 Id. at 347.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 348.
32 Id. at 337.
33 Id. at 348-49.
34 Id. at 348.
35 Id. at 350-51.
36 Id. at 349-50.
37 See id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (suggesting that the State may "in
other, larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its
identity").
38 Id. at 351. Justice Scalia notes, correctly, that the Court's indication that a
.more limited identification requirement" might be upheld is inconsistent with its
application of "exacting scrutiny" in McIntyre. Id. at 380-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 82:41544
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and their organized supporters, -1
9 requirements applicable only to
"elections of public officers,"40 and requirements applicable only to
"leaflets distributed on the eve of an election.
4 1 Although the Court
never fully explains this dictum, one possible explanation 
is that the
right to speak anonymously is qualified precisely because 
anonymity
sometimes deprives the audience of information 
that has significant
communicative value. The Court's decision acknowledges 
that an
author's identity, as content, contributes to the communicative 
impact
of her work.42 As the Court notes, in the realm 
of political rhetoric a
speaker's identity "is an important component 
of many attempts to
persuade."43 The Court also concedes that author 
identity helps "crit-
ics in evaluating the quality and significance of 
the writing."44 But this
concession suggests that an author's name may 
be even more impor-
tant than other types of "content," and stripping 
an author's identity
from a work may deprive the audience of an important 
clue to unlock-
ing its meaning.
Why are the interests in protecting speaker 
autonomy and
increasing contributions to the marketplace of ideas enough 
tojustify,
in the name of the First Amendment, depriving 
speakers of informa-
tion that might be needed to correctly interpret 
a work? Author iden-
tity, the Court asserts, is not "indispensable" to 
the interpretation of a
work.45 The Court reaches this conclusion based 
on its theory regard-
ing audience response to anonymous speech. 
Toward the end of the
McIntyre opinion, the Court posits that the "inherent 
worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing 
the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source."
46 However, this conclusion
rests on the assumption that the audience will use 
other clues of qual-
39 Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 352.
42 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: 
Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 640
(1990) ("In most circumstances we attend as carefully to 
the social status of a speaker,
and to the social context of her words, as 
we do to the bare content of her
communication.").
43 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 (quoting City of Ladue 
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56
(1994)).
44 Id. at 342 n.5; see also id. at 348 n.11 (noting that a 
source's identity is "'helpful
in evaluating ideas'" (quoting New York v. Duryea, 351 
N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (Sup. Ct.
1974))).
45 Id. at 342 n.5.
46 Id. at 353 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978)).
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ity and significance to play the role that might in some cases be played
by author identity.
The Court's explanation of the process by which the audience
"interprets" author anonymity is oblique. As noted above, the Court
suggests that the identity of an author unknown to the audience
would add few clues to the meaning of the text. Yet even where an
author's identity would be helpful to an audience, the Court believes
that the audience is skilled enough to interpret most messages without
it. The Court quotes with approval the following statement from New
York v. Duyea4 7:
"Don't underestimate the common man. People are intelligent
enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing .... They
can see it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with
its message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read
that message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them to
decide what is 'responsible,' what is valuable, and what is truth."48
The quote makes several contestable assumptions about the audi-
ence of anonymous speech. Crucially, it presumes the existence of an
audience united by common values and habits of interpretation. But
the audience for anonymous speech is essentially a construct. The
Court did not consult poll data or experts before deciding that Mar-
garet McIntyre's handbill would not mislead or fool the voters who
received it. Instead, the Court simply stated that "[t] here is no sugges-
tion that the text of [McIntyre's] message was false, misleading, or
libelous," even though the fact that it was signed "Concerned Parents
and Taxpayers" might well lead one to assume that numerous citizens
had joined in the handbill. 49 What the Court seems to be suggesting
is that anyone who read McIntyre's message critically would not be
misled-taking into account the facts that the author was unknown,
that anyone could adopt the label "Concerned Parents and Taxpay-
ers," and that the text had grammatical errors, an unsophisticated
graphic design, and a clear bias on a controversial local political issue.
Thus the McIntyre Court appears to be imputing, in the name of
the First Amendment, certain qualities to the audience of anonymous
speech. Ostensibly this audience is composed of common men, who
can exercise common sense to give the proper weight to anonymous
speech. The "common man" in the audience presumably will use the
tone and style of the text, the context in which it appears, and the
persuasiveness of its arguments in deciding "what is 'responsible,'
47 351 N.YS.2d 978.
48 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348 n.l (quoting Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 996)).
49 Id. at 337.
1546 [VOL. 82:4
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what is valuable, and what is truth."
50 The Court portrays this as sim-
ply an instance of the marketplace of ideas determining 
the value of
ideas5 1 and demands no empirical evidence about 
how any particular
audience member would interpret anonymous 
speech.
The Court's theory of audience response to 
anonymous speech is
a critical underpinning of the McIntyre decision, 
but the Court never
spells out the full implications of the theory. 
The Court implicitly
acknowledges that audiences cannot always 
gauge the value of anony-
mous speech; as a result, both individual audience 
members and rea-
soned discourse as a whole may be harmed. 
Moreover, the Court
recognizes that anonymity should not shield 
abusive speakers from
accountability, and that the right to speak 
anonymously may be out-
weighed by other important rights. But the 
Court gives little guidance
about how to calibrate the balance.
52 Instead, the Court merely
expresses faith in the audience's ability 
to discount anonymous
speech, reducing (but not eliminating) any potential 
harm that might
flow from it.
B. McConnell and the Dangers of Anonymous Speech
The Court's faith in the critical faculties 
of the audience for
anonymous speech appeared to waver 
in McConnell.53  McConnell
addressed the constitutionality of several provisions 
of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) ,54 and, in the process, 
clouded
the status of the constitutional right to 
speak anonymously.
5 5 The
BCRA's main purpose was to close loopholes 
in existing campaign
finance regulations, especially the "soft money" 
loophole in the Fed-
50 Id. at 349 n.l1.
51 justice Scalia's dissent,joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, 
argued that the Ohio
law "forbids the expression of no idea, but merely 
requires identification of the
speaker when the idea is uttered in the electoral 
context." Id. at 378 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). The dissent further argued that in the absence of 
evidence that the Framers
intended the First Amendment to protect anonymous 
speech, the Court should defer
to the "long-accepted practices" of the states in 
regulating the electoral process. Id.
52 See id. at 381 ("It may take decades to work out the shape 
of this newly
expanded right-to-speak-incognito, even in the elections 
field.").
53 540 U.S. 93, 126-28, 193-97 (2003).
54 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered 
sections of 2
and 47 U.S.C.). The Act is also commonly referred to as the McCain-Feingold 
Act.
55 See, e.g., Richard M. Cardillo, Note, I Am Publius, and 
I Approve This Message: The
Baffling and Conflicted State of Anonymous Pamphleteering Post-McConnell, 
80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1929, 1941 (2005) (detailing the confusion McConnell 
created in lower
courts).
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eral Election Campaign Act (FECA). 56 However, the BCRA also
imposed various disclosure requirements whose effect was to limit cer-
tain types of anonymous political speech during election campaigns. 57
Largely ignoring McIntyre, the Supreme Court upheld most of these
disclosure requirements, often relying on paternalistic assumptions
about the imagined audience at which this anonymous campaign
speech would be targeted.
A bit of background is necessary to understand the BCRA's disclo-
sure requirements. In 1971, the FECA58 began requiring sponsors of
political ads expressly advocating election or defeat of a candidate to
disclose their names to the Federal Election Commission (FEC).59
The FEC construed the disclosure provision to apply only when an
election ad contained "'magic words' such as 'Elect John Smith' or
'Vote Against Jane Doe."' 60 The FECA did not require sponsors of
"issue ads" to disclose their identities.6 1 Issue ads do not expressly
advocate election or defeat of a candidate. Not only were issue ads
exempt from the disclosure requirements of the FECA; they were also
exempt from provisions that capped the source and amount of funds
that could be spent on express advocacy.62 This meant that anyone
who wanted to sponsor an ad advocating for or against a candidate
could avoid the FECA's disclosure and spending limitations as long as
the sponsor was clever enough to avoid using the "magic words." 63 As
a result, issue ads meant to influence elections proliferated. 64
One of the chief goals of the BCRA was to curb perceived abuses
that flowed from the FECA's deferential treatment of issue ads. 65 To
achieve this goal, the BCRA broadened the FECA's disclosure require-
56 McConnel4 540 U.S. at 123. The FECA limits the amount of contributions
made to influence federal election campaigns ("hard money" contributions); these
limits, however, do not apply to contributions of" 'nonfederal money'-also known as
'soft money'-to political parties for activities intended to influence state or local
elections." Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (2000)).
57 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 434 & note, 441d (Supp. IV 2004); 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp.
IV 2004).
58 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
59 McConnelL 540 U.S. at 126 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976)).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 121-22. Express advocacy must be financed with "hard money," that is,
"funds that are subject to the Act's disclosure requirements and source and amount
limitations." Id. at 122. Prior to the BCRA, "issue ads" could be financed with "soft
money," that is, funds not subject to the FECA's limitations. Id. at 122-26.
63 Id. at 126.
64 Id. at 127-28.
65 Id. at 194.
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ments to apply to a new category of ads known as "electioneering 
com-
munications." Electioneering communications are "broadcast, cable,
or satellite communication[s]" that refer to a candidate 
for federal
office in the sixty days prior to the general election 
or the thirty days
prior to the primary.66 The BCRA subjected this new category of elec-
tioneering communications to "significant 
disclosure requirements.
6 7
Justices Stevens and O'Connor upheld the electioneering 
provi-
sions in a decision joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
and Souter 68
The McConnell majority revealed a relatively hostile attitude 
toward
anonymous political speech. To begin with, 
the McConnell majority
agreed that the proliferation of issue ads during 
election campaigns
was a problem and implied that this was at 
least in part because the
ads were often anonymous.
69 For example, the Court noted that
sponsors of "so-called issue ads . . . often 
used misleading names to
conceal their identity."
70 As this sentence suggests, the Court ques-
tioned both the motives of those who sponsor issue 
ads and the contri-
bution they make to public debate. The objectionable ads 
were not
"true issue ad[s" 7 1 because their sponsors sought 
to support or defeat
a candidate, albeit without using the "magic words" 
denoting express
advocacy; presumably a true issue ad would address 
a public contro-
versy without connecting it in any way to particular 
candidates.7 2 Even
though the deception would have been readily 
obvious to potential
voters, the Court denigrated the motives of the 
sponsors because they
were attempting to disguise their objective: to support or defeat 
a par-
ticular candidate.
Furthermore, the Court denigrated the motives 
of the sponsors
precisely because they often chose to remain 
anonymous. The Court
criticized them as attempting to "hide themselves 
from the scrutiny of
the voting public," and accepted the argument 
that this would impair
the public's ability "to make informed choices 
in the political market-
66 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f) (3) (A) (i) (West Supp. IV 2004). 
They also must be
targeted to an audience of at least 50,000 viewers 
or listeners within the relevant elec-
torate. This definition of electioneering communications, 
which appears in section
201 of the BCRA, amends section 304 of the 
FECA.
67 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190. The BCRA 
also limits the funding of election-
eering communications by corporations and 
unions. Id.
68 Id. at 114-224 (Justices Stevens and O'Connor delivered 
the opinion of the
Court with respect to BCRA Tides I and II, in 
which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined).
69 Id. at 126-29.
70 Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 193.
72 Id. at 126.
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place."73 What is it about these kinds of anonymous ads 
that would
impair the public's ability to make informed political 
choices? The
Court endorsed the notion that the ads were "dubious 
and mislead-
ing"74 because the pseudonyms under which they 
were aired sug-
gested a broad base of support for their views. 
As an example, the
Court cited "'Republicans for Clean Air,' which ran 
ads in the 2000
Republican Presidential primary, [and] was actually an organization
consisting of just two individuals. ' 75 One might quibble that this 
is
little different than Margaret McIntyre calling herself 
"Concerned
Parents and Taxpayers," which the Court deemed 
not to be mislead-
ing.76 Certainly the nature of the chosen pseudonym 
is not much dif-
ferent here than it was in McIntyre.
Why should the voting public be smart enough to 
see through
Margaret McIntyre's attempt to give her message more 
weight but not
smart enough to see through the same tactic when 
used by "Republi-
cans for Clean Air"? Moreover, whatever happened 
to the argument
that the choice to remain anonymous is just like any other editorial
choice an author might make? The McConnell Court 
gave no defer-
ence to this editorial choice when it noted that 
many "mysterious
groups" ran issue ads under "misleading names" to 
increase the ads'
effectiveness.77  No longer was this a choice of 
content like any
other,78 but was instead just a dirty campaign trick.
The Court's hostile assumptions about both the motives 
behind
and the importance of anonymous political ads led 
it to conclude that
the BCRA's various disclosure requirements were constitutional. 
The
Court's scrutiny of BCRA section 201 illustrates some 
of these assump-
tions.79 Section 201 amended the FECA to require 
anyone who dis-
73 Id. at 197.
74 Id. (citing the district court's per curiam opinion with approval).
75 Id. at 128.
76 See supra Part I.A.
77 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128 n.2
3
. Admittedly, the Court was also concerned that
these issue ads were being used by candidates and 
political parties to circumvent
FECA limitations. Id. at 129.
78 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 
334, 355 (1995).
79 These same assumptions are mirrored in the Court's 
treatment of section 504
of the BCRA. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 § 504, 47 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)
(Supp. IV 2004). Section 504 directly affects the right to speak 
anonymously. Id.
Section 504 amends the Communications Act of 1934 
to require broadcasters to keep
public records of all requests to purchase broadcast 
time "made by or on behalf of a
legally qualified candidate for public office." Id. More 
sweepingly, the disclosure pro-
vision also applies to purchasers of broadcast time to 
"communicate [] a message relat-
ing to any political matter of national importance." Id. (emphasis 
added). In essence,
section 504 contains three disclosure requirements: 
(1) the candidate request
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burses, or makes a contract to disburse, $10,000 dollars or more per
calendar year on electioneering communications to file a statement
with the FEC.80 This statement must identify, among other things, all
those who contributed $1000 or more to the disbursement. Although
the Court recognized that this disclosure requirement might, as
applied, interfere with the First Amendment right of association,8 ' it
gave no apparent weight to the potential for interference with anony-
mous political speech. Indeed, the Court concluded that section
201's disclosure requirements "d[ol not prevent anyone from speak-
ing."82 The Court found the requirement was amply supported by
three "important state interests," namely, "providing the electorate
with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any
appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce
more substantive electioneering restrictions."8' 3
The Court's reliance on the "informational rationale" is troub-
ling.8 4 An author's name will almost always provide relevant informa-
requirement, which affects requests "made by or on behalf of" candidates for public
office; (2) the election message requirement, which affects requests to broadcast
information referring to a "legally qualified candidate" or to any election to Federal
office; and (3) the issue request requirement, which affects requests that refer to any
"national legislative issue of public importance," or any "political matter of national
importance." Id. The Court concluded that the section 504 provision was facially
constitutional under "any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including
that of heightened scrutiny." See McConnel, 540 U.S. at 245. The Court's opinion
focused primarily on the burden the regulation placed on broadcasters, rather than
the burden it placed on would-be anonymous speakers. See id. at 359 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing examples from the majority opinion to argue that "Itlhe Court
approaches § 504 almost exclusively from the perspective of the broadcast licensees").
The Court reasoned that section 504's burdens are similar to those already imposed
on broadcasters by Federal Communications Commission regulations. Id. at 245
(majority opinion). Essentially ignoring the rights of the would-be anonymous speak-
ers, the Court refused to apply exacting scrutiny to the disclosure requirement. Id. at
141. But see Wis. Right to Life Inc. v. FEC, 126 S. Ct. 1016, 1017-18 (2006) (per
curiam) (allowing an "as-applied" challenge to the disclosure provisions by a self-pro-
claimed "grassroots lobbying organization" to go forward).
80 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f) (2) (A), (B), (D) (Supp. IV 2004).
81 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 197-98.
82 Id. at 201 (alterations in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d
176, 241 (D.D.C. 2003)).
83 Id. at 196.
84 Raleigh Levine notes the Court's growing reliance on the informational ratio-
nale in the electoral context: "(T] he Court remains committed to the long-ingrained
national conception that the electorate should consist of informed, intelligent voters,
and ... the Court has become increasingly concerned that voters may not exercise
their right to vote in the manner that the Court prefers." Raleigh Hannah Levine,
The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme Court's Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE
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tion to the audience, and if that interest alone is sufficient 
to
overcome the right to speak anonymously, the 
right has little mean-
ing.8 5 Moreover, as Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, 
the McIntyre
Court explicitly rejected the notion that the "simple interest in 
provid-
ing voters with additional relevant information 
... justif [ied] a state
requirement that a writer make statements 
or disclosures she would
otherwise omit."8
6 Certainly the interest in providing information 
to
the audience would not justify requiring authors to make other 
types
of content additions. A political ad might be 
more informative if it
were broadcast in black and white and its message 
was read somberly
by an announcer, but a statute attempting to 
require this would cer-
tainly be struck down as an interference with political 
speech. Nor,
one suspects, would the government be constitutionally 
justified if it
were to require all books to include an index, 
even if this would make
them more informative.
The McConnell Court did not rely solely on 
the informational
rationale in upholding section 201's disclosure 
requirements, how-
ever, and for that reason it is possible to make 
a credible argument
distinguishing McConnell from McIntyre. In 
McConnell, the Justices in
the majority gave great weight to the argument that the disclosure
requirements were necessary to deter corruption 
and prevent circum-
vention of other campaign finance regulations.
87 The campaign regu-
lation in McIntyre affected anonymous speech 
in support of a ballot
referendum, i.e., advertising on behalf of an 
issue. By contrast, the
regulations in McConnell affected advertising by 
supporters of a candi-
date, creating a danger that the candidate, if elected, 
would "repay" his
supporters with favorable legislation. Thus, the 
anticorruption ratio-
nale and anticircumvention rationales are 
arguably stronger in
W. Res. L. REV. 225, 243 (2003). Levine notes that historically 
the interest in insuring
informed voters helped justify literacy tests. Id. at 239-40.
85 See Elizabeth Garrett, Commentary, McConnell 
v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELEC-
TiO N L.J. 237, 240-42 (2004) (noting that McConnelfs informational 
rationale could
also be applied in the context of issue elections).
86 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 276 (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 
U.S. 334, 348 (1995)); see
also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (striking 
down a law used to "punish a
newspaper editor" for "publishing an editorial 
on election day" and rejecting the
argument that the statute was a reasonable means 
of protecting the public "from con-
fusive [sic] last-minute charges and countercharges"); 
Tien, supra note 18, at 155
(stating that the identity of Margaret McIntyre would 
have provided very little infor-
mation to her audience and thus "[t]here [wa]s no 
victim in McIntyre. Thus, the
Court could wax poetic about the virtues of anonymous 
speech because the only vic-
tim would be discourse itself.").
87 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-44 (majority opinion).
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McConnell than McIntyre. Even so, the Ohio law at issue 
in McIntyre
was not justified solely by an interest in providing voters more infor-
mation; Ohio had also invoked its interest in 
preventing fraud and
libel, but the Court rejected this as inadequate to justify infringing 
the
right to speak anonymously.
88
The McConnell Court not only gave more weight to 
the state inter-
est in preventing corruption than the McIntyre 
Court; it also tacitly
assumed that advertising on behalf of a candidate 
makes less of a con-
tribution to public debate than advertising purely 
to advance an issue.
As Justice Kennedy pointed out, however, the 
distinction the Court
attempted to draw is rather arbitrary.
89 Often the reason one sup-
ports a candidate is precisely because of his 
views on policy issues.
Nonetheless, the potential for corruption is 
indeed greater, and it
must be remembered that the disclosure requirements 
were part of a
much larger program of campaign finance 
reform designed to
decrease the influence of "big money" on the 
political system.90 Even
so, the McIntyre Court explicitly rejected the argument McConnell
seems to adopt, namely, that the Ohio law regulated 
merely the elec-
toral process rather than pure speech.
9
'
Two additional features distinguish McConnell 
from McIntyre.
First, McConnell dealt with broadcasting rather 
than print media. In
the broadcast context, the First Amendment right 
of "viewers and lis-
teners" to receive information sometimes trumps 
broadcasters' First
Amendment right to exercise editorial discretion.
92 Broadcasters are
subject to extensive government regulation to ensure that they 
pre-
88 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-52.
89 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in
part).
90 Id. at 115 (majority opinion). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 66-67 (1976), the
Court stated that "disclosure provides the electorate 
with information 'as to where
political campaign money comes from and how 
it is spent by the candidate' in order
to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal 
office" (quoting H.R. REP. No.
92-564, at 4 (1971)).
91 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345.
92 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 
390 (1969). The Supreme Court
has even upheld a limited right of access to the 
broadcast medium on behalf of candi-
dates for federal office; this limited right of access 
"makes a significant contribution to
freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of 
candidates to present, and the pub-
lic to receive, information necessary for the effective 
operation of the democratic pro-
cess." CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (upholding 
the FCC's interpretation
of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (Supp. 
IV 2004), which requires
broadcast licensees to give federal candidates 
"reasonable access" to the airwaves).
This right of access would be clearly unconstitutional 
if applied to the print media.
See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241, 256 (1974).
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sent conflicting views on issues of public 
importan c e . "5 More to the
point, federal law has long required broadcasters 
to provide the pub-
lic with adequate information about candidates 
for federal office and
to keep records of candidate requests 
for broadcast time.
9 4 The
BCRA, according to the Court, merely expanded 
these existing obliga-
tions.9 5 Moreover, the McConnell majority explicitly 
contemplated
that the audience for "documents" might 
be different than the audi-
ence for broadcasts and refused to address 
the constitutionality of reg-
ulation of broadcast anonymous 
speech. 96
Second, the speakers affected by the 
disclosure requirements in
McConnell were primarily corporate 
entities or unions. While the
Supreme Court has generally held 
that corporations have the same
speech rights as individuals,
97 its decisions in the context of election
campaigns have treated corporations 
and other organizations differ-
ently than individual speakers.
9 8 McConnell, on one reading, simply
applies the logic of prior "corporate 
electoral speech"
99 decisions in
finding a compelling interest in limiting 
"'the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth 
that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that 
have little or no correlation to
the public's support for the corporation's 
political ideas."
1 0 0 In other
words, corporations and unions should 
not be allowed to exercise
"undue influence" on the electoral process, 
and their speech may be
93 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 239 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 
(2002)).
94 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000) (requiring broadcasters 
that give time to
one candidate to provide an "equal opportunity" 
to other candidates for the same
office); id. § 315(b) (Supp. III 2003) (providing that 
broadcasters must allow candi-
dates to purchase ads at their "lowest unit 
charge"); id. § 315(e) (imposing, even
prior to passage of the BCRA, disclosure requirements 
regarding "candidate requests"
to purchase time).
95 According to the Court, these expanded 
disclosure obligations were not
unduly burdensome on broadcasters, McConnell, 
540 U.S. at 242, and they had the
virtue of helping "the public evaluate broadcasting 
fairness." Id. at 239.
96 See id. at 245.
97 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 777 (1978); see also Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 
U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (asserting that "Itlhe
identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining 
whether speech is protected"
and affirming that the First Amendment rights 
of corporations and other organiza-
tions are equal to those of individual speakers).
98 See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, 
Securities Regulation and an Institu-
tional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 Wm. 
& MARY L. REv. 613, 636-41 (2006)
(emphasizing this point and collecting cases).
99 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 258.
100 Id. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990)).
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regulated lest it drown out the speech of individual citizens and
impair their ability to choose their representatives.
Even if McConnell and McIntyre are technically distinguishable,
they have a deep theoretical inconsistency. The McConnell Court's
assumptions about both the value of anonymous speech and the abil-
ity of the audience to properly interpret it differed markedly from the
assumptions in McIntyre. The McConnell majority seems hostile to
anonymous or pseudonymous speech in the election context. The
McConnell opinion rests on paternalistic notions about the abilities of
voters; as opponents of campaign finance reform have argued, even
the assumption that "money influences outcomes paternalistically
implies that voters cannot sift through various information to make
decisions."101 McIntyre, on the other hand, assumes voters are savvy
consumers of political information, able to discern the partisan moti-
vations behind campaign literature and make informed decisions
even without knowing the identity of the author. 102
C. Why Anonymity Matters Now
This theoretical inconsistency makes the two decisions unstable
guides for the new challenges presented by anonymous speech on the
Internet. 0 3 McConnell and McIntyre both involved anonymous speech
in the physical world, where the ability to be truly anonymous is lim-
ited. By contrast, the architecture of the internet makes it easy to
speak anonymously, or at least pseudonymously. 10 4 As a result, there
101 See Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Partici-
pation, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 73, 86 & n.42 (2004) (citing opponents of reform).
102 As communications theorist ten Ang has observed, the social construction of
an "audience" is a mechanism of exercising power over that audience. IN ANG, DES-
PEIRATELY SEEIUNG TnE AUDIENCE 7 (1991). Yet the "audience" itself remains "an imag-
inary entity, an abstraction constructed from the vantage point of [an) institution [)."
Id. at 2. Ang observes: "[M]asses are illusory totalities: there are no masses, 'only ways
of seeing people as masses."' Id. (quoting RAYMOND WILLIAMs, CULTURE AND SOCIETv
289 (1961)).
103 This inconsistency is not unique to the anonymous speech issue, and occasion-
ally the Supreme Court will explicitly lay out its paternalistic assumptions about the
audience. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) (stating that
the First Amendment does not prevent states from having laws that regulate what
issuers of securities "may write or publish about their wares" because "[s]uch laws are
to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the
exercise of their own volition").
104 Catherine Crump, Note, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and Accountability
Online, 56 STAN. L. REV. 191, 217 (2003) (contending that the "architecture of real
space" curbs "this unaccountable form of speech" and that "anonymity is substantially
easier to achieve on the Internet").
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are more anonymous speakers than ever before 
using the freedom
anonymity provides for both good and bad purposes. 
Certainly
Internet anonymity has made public discussion more 
"uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"
10 5 than ever before, but at the same time it has
magnified the number of speakers abusing the 
right to speak
anonymously.
From a legal standpoint, anonymity issues come 
in a variety of
guises. One of the most common types of cases 
involves a pseudony-
mous speaker who uses the Internet to criticize 
a powerful corpora-
tion, institution, or public figure.
10 6 The targets of the criticism
retaliate by suing the speaker for defamation, 
disclosure of trade
secrets, or some other allegedly tortious act. Typically, 
the plaintiff
initiates suit against "John Doe," perhaps identifying 
him by screen
name, and then subpoenasJohn Doe's Internet 
service provider (ISP)
to disclose his true identity.
10 7 Some plaintiffs pursue 'John Doe"
suits as their only available remedy against 
harmful anonymous
speech; other plaintiffs bring "John Doe" suits 
to discover who their
critics are so they can retaliate against them 
and silence other crit-
ics.108 If plaintiffs can obtain the identity of an 
anonymous speaker
with nothing more than an unfounded allegation 
of defamation, the
right to speak anonymously is meaningless. On 
the other hand, ano-
nymity cannot be a complete shield for tortious 
speech. Thus, courts
are struggling to craft standards to distinguish 
"cyberSLAPPs" from
legitimate tort claims before compelling defendants 
to disclose their
identities.'09
Another prominent anonymity issue has involved 
attempts by the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) to track 
down
online copyright infringers. After several courts 
concluded that the
RIAA could not use the subpoena provisions of 
the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (DMCA) to force ISPs to reveal the identities 
of
ISP subscribers whom the RIAA suspected had engaged 
in online cop-
yright infringement,' 10 the RIAA began resorting 
to the "John Doe"
105 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964).
106 For further discussion, see generally Lidsky, 
supra note 10 (discussing attempts
to silence anonymous speakers on the Internet).
107 Id. at 889.
108 The term "SLAPP" stands for strategic lawsuits 
against public participation. See
George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 3, 3 (1989). A SLAPP is a lawsuit, typically brought as a 
defamation action,
aimed at silencing legitimate speech on matters 
of public concern. Id.
109 See infra Part IV.B.
110 Specifically, three courts have concluded that 
the Copyright Act § 512(h), Pub.
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877, 2883 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)), 
does not author-
ize the clerk of the court to subpoena an ISP that 
acts merely as a conduit for the
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procedure in these types of cases as well."' 
The RIAA reportedly has
succeeded in compelling ISPs to reveal the identities 
of several thou-
sand users.1 12 In one of the leading cases, Sony 
Music Entertainment
Inc. v. Does 1-40,1 iJudge Chin concluded that, 
although file sharing
is "not 'political expression' entitled to the 
'broadest protection' of
the First Amendment,"
114 it is "entitled to 'some level of First Amend-
ment protection." Nevertheless, he found 
the plaintiff was entitled
to discovery of the alleged file sharers' identities, 
based upon (1) a
sufficiently "concrete showing of a prima 
facie claim of actionable
harm,"' 16 including "supporting evidence listing 
the copyrighted song
transmission of allegedly infringing materials by third 
parties, but rather only when,
inter alia, the ISP can remove or disable access 
to allegedly infringing material. See In
re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 776-78 
(8th Cir. 2005); Recording Indus.
Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 
351 F.3d 1229, 1233-36 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
In re Subpoena to Univ. of N.C., 367 F. Supp. 
2d 945, 950-56 (M.D.N.C. 2005); see also
17 U.S.C. §512(h)(2)(A) (2000) (incorporating 
by reference 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c) (3) (A)). The dissenting judge in Charter Communications 
and the district
court in Verizon concluded that § 512(h) does apply with 
respect to ISPs that function
merely as conduits. See Charter Commc'ns, 393 
F.3d at 779-83 (Murphy, J., dissenting);
In reVerizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 
2d 24, 29-39 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd, 351
F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Judge Murphy also rejected 
arguments that § 512(h)
unconstitutionally burdens the right of subscribers 
to remain anonymous, reasoning
that subscribers who anonymously transmit 
copyrighted materials over the Internet
are not engaging in protected expression. 
See Charter Commc'n, 393 F.3d at 785-86
(Murphy, J., dissenting). Judge Bates concluded that, 
although "there is some level of
First Amendment protection that should be 
afforded to anonymous expression on the
Internet," that "protection is minimal where 
alleged copyright infringement is the
expression at issue," and in any event, the DMCA 
provides sufficient safeguards inso-
far as it requires copyright owners to, among 
other things, plead a prima facie case of
infringement. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., 
Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 258-64
(D.D.C. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003). In a follow-up
article, we hope to discuss the constitutional 
dimensions of anonymous speech specifi-
cally as it relates to the DMCA procedures.
111 For discussion, see, for example, Lori 
A. Morea, The Future of Music in a Digital
Age: The Ongoing Conflict Between Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer 
Technology, 28 CAMPBELL
L. REv. 195, 205-09 (2006); Robert C. Piasentin, Unlawful? 
Innovative? Unstoppable?
A. Comparative Analysis of the Potential Legal Liability Facing 
P2P End-Users in the United
States, United Kingdom and Canada, 14 INT'L 
J.L. & INFO. TECH. 195, 201-02 (2006);
Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers, 
and Other Good Targets for the
Recording Industry's File Sharing Litigation, 4 Nw. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133, 134-35
(2006).
112 SeeMorea, supranote 111, at 205-06; Piasentin, 
supra note 111, at 201-02; Sag,
supra note 111, at 135.
113 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
114 Id. at 563 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346
(1994)).
115 Id. at 563 (quoting Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 
260).
116 Id. at 564.
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downloaded or distributed" and the dates and times of the acts
alleged;117 (2) the "specificity of the discovery request"; (3) the
"absence of alternative means" of discovering the users' identities;" 8
(4) the centrality of the need for this information; and (5) in light of
the terms of the users' ISP service agreement, their lack of a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy with respect to the downloading and distri-
bution of copyrighted works. 119
These two categories of online anonymity cases have garnered
the lion's share of scholarly attention, but anonymity issues arise in
other contexts as well. Congress and the states are attempting to com-
bat spammers who hide behind anonymity to overwhelm targeted
computer servers with millions of e-mails.' 20 The Securities and
Exchange Commission is working desperately to combat securities
fraud committed by anonymous speakers.12' More troublingly, fed-
eral and state legislators are passing laws to curb anonymous speech
online. A new federal law makes it a crime for a speaker to use the
Internet to "annoy" someone unless the speaker reveals his or her true
identity. 122 A New Jersey bill, if passed, will require any "public forum
Web site" to collect the names and addresses of everyone who posts to
the site.' 23 And there are calls for further regulation. John
Siegenthaler, a journalist and former assistant to Attorney General
Robert Kennedy, criticized Congress for enabling and protecting "vol-
117 Id. at 565.
118 Id. at 564.
119 Id. at 564-67; accord UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Does 1-4, No. 06-0652
SBA(EMC), 2006 WL 1343597, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2006); Elektra Entm't
Group, Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289(RWS), 2004 WL 2095581, at * 2-5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 8, 2004).
120 For a brief discussion of sparn regulation, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material
Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 129, 158-59 (2005).
121 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Michael Pike, Cybergossip or Securities Fraud? Some
First Amendment Guidance in Drawing the Line, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM, Oct. 2001, at
15, available at 5 No. 5 GLWSLAW 15 (Westlaw).
122 The provision comes from section 113 of the Violence Against Women and
Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2006). The section is entitled "Preventing Cyberstalking," and it provides that
whoever utilizes "any device or software that can be used to originate telecommunica-
tions or other types of communications that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by
the Internet," id. § 223(h)(1)(C), "without disclosing his identity and with intent to
annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person ... who receives the communications...
shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id.
§ 223(a).
123 See Assemb. 1327, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006), available at: http://www.
njleg.state.nj .us/2006/Bills/AI500/1327_12.PDF.
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unteer vandals with poison-pen intellects" after he was defamed 
by an
anonymous speaker on Wikipedia.2
4 Siegenthaler criticized Congress
both for immunizing Internet service providers 
from tort liability
based on content posted by their users and for 
failing to force service
providers to help uncover the identity of anonymous 
defamers.
Whatever the merits of Siegenthaler's arguments, 
it seems clear that
legal issues concerning online anonymity will 
continue to arise, and
when they do, courts and legislators can expect 
only limited guidance
from McConnell and McIntyre.
1I. A POSITIvE ANALYSIS OF ANONYMOUS SPEECH
Neither McIntyre nor McConnell appears to recognize 
the true
complexity of anonymous speech. Speakers may 
use the shield of ano-
nymity for a variety of purposes, only some of 
which may be consistent
with the public good; at the same time, audiences 
may not accord
anonymous speech as much value as attributed 
speech, which in turn
may affect speakers' decisions whether to publish 
anonymously in the
first place. In this Part, we attempt to catalogue 
the costs and benefits
of anonymous speech, both to speaker and audience, 
as well as the
strategic considerations that are likely to impact 
both speaker and
audience behavior. We will then suggest in Parts 
III and IV a method
for normatively weighing these costs and benefits 
so as to arrive at
concrete policy recommendations.
A. The Informational Value of Authorial Identity
We begin our positive analysis by noting 
a curious fact about
anonymous speech: Anonymous speech persists 
despite the fact that it
is, on average, less valuable than nonanonymous 
speech to speech
consumers (audiences) who often use speaker identity 
as an indica-
tion of a work's likely truthfulness, artistic 
value, or intellectual merit.
Without attribution, audiences must necessarily 
rely upon other indi-
cia, which can be less reliable than speaker 
identity. In this regard,
attribution serves a function analogous to that 
of a trademark used in
connection with a product or service, whereas 
anonymous speech is
like a generic or nontrademarked product: 
Consumers must work
harder, sometimes considerably harder, before 
they can draw reliable
conclusions about the qualities 
of the product itself.
1 25
124 John Seigenthaler, Op-Ed., A False Wikipedia 'Biography, 
'USA TODAY, Nov. 30,
2005, at 1lA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-
11-29-wikipedia-edit-x'htm"
125 See Fisk, supra note 2, at 62-64, 74; Heymann, 
supra note 2, at 1378; Lastowka,
supra note 2, at 1179; see also MARK ROSE, 
AUTHORS AND OWNERS 1-2 (1993) (observ-
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To illustrate, suppose that you encounter an anonymous pam-
phlet attributing some moral failing to the President of the United
States. Depending on how well or how poorly the allegations mesh
with your background beliefs and assumptions about the President's
character, you assign some implicit probability to the veracity of the
allegations.12 6 You will also look to other indicia to gauge the truth of
the allegation, e.g., the professional quality of the pamphlet, whether
it contains misspellings and grammatical errors, and the like. Sup-
pose that, on the basis of all this evidence, you conclude that the
probability that the allegations are true is 50%. Now suppose that, in
addition to the other indicia of truth or falsity, you know the speaker's
identity. First assume the speaker is someone whose integrity you
know to be impeccable: George, the modern-day equivalent of Parson
ing that "[tihe name of the author becomes.., a kind of brand name, a recognizable
sign that the cultural commodity will be of a certain kind and quality" and noting that
"copyright... helps to produce and affirm the very identity of the author as author").
To understand the analogy, imagine a world with no trademarks, i.e., without unique
symbols that identify differentiated products or services. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2000) (defining a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof. . . used by a person . . .to identify and distinguish his or her goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indi-
cate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown"). You enter a conve-
nience store to buy a soft drink and are immediately confronted with several cans or
bottles all stamped with the generic word "Cola." Different firms produce these dif-
ferent drinks, using different formulas, and each tastes slightly different. In fact, you
may have a favorite, but there is no way to tell which is which without sampling the
goods until you find the one you like the best. In the real world, trademarks come to
the rescue by reducing the cost of searching among differentiated goods for the ones
that contain the specific characteristics you value the most. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THwro) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 9 cmts. b-c (1995). Trademarks also encourage
producers to invest in quality control. Consumers will rely upon trademarks as source
identifiers only if the trademarked product has roughly the same characteristics each
time a consumer encounters it. Trademark owners therefore have an interest in
maintaining consistent quality in order to develop and preserve customer goodwill.
See id. As long as quality remains constant, consumers who prefer the taste of Coca-
Cola to Pepsi can readily find the product that satisfies their preference, and vice
versa. We argue above that the author's identity performs a trademark-like function
of enabling speech consumers to draw inferences about, and speech producers to
invest in promoting, the quality of expressive works.
126 See, e.g., Linda Simon et al., Trivialization: The Forgotten Mode of Dissonance Reduc-
tion, 68J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCs-IOL. 247, 256-59 (1995) (discussing ways in which
people approach new information that relates to existing beliefs, so as to reduce cog-
nitive dissonance). Consider, for example, the allegation that former President Wil-
liam Clinton had an adulterous relationship with a famous singer. The same
allegation would be less credible if made about President George W. Bush or Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter.
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Weems's "I cannot tell a lie" George Washington.12 7 Given this new
piece of information, you would change your probability-of-truth esti-
mate from 50% to, say, 90%. (Changing it to 100% might be taking
things too far; it is possible, after all, that George, though honest, is
mistaken.) Alternatively, assume you know the speaker to be Cretan, a
pathological liar.1 28 Armed with this information, you would alter
your probability estimate downward, say to 10%. A third possibility is
that knowledge of the speaker's identity would provide you with no
useful information at all; the speaker is unknown to you, and his credi-
bility is not important enough for you to investigate further. On these
facts, knowledge of the speaker's identity does not change your ex ante
probability estimate of 50%. Reflection therefore suggests that knowl-
edge of the speaker's identity does not always matter to you; but that
in some nontrivial class of cases, not knowing the author's identity
could mislead you into either over- or underestimating the state-
ment's truth value..2 9 We must also consider that the speaker is aware
that disclosing his identity might discount the credibility of his mes-
sage. So once again, consider the three possible speaker-types: one
speaker whose identity, if revealed, would cause you to revise your
127 Mason Locke Weems published the first edition of his hagiographical biogra-
phy of Washington anonymously around 1800, the year after Washington's death.
Weems added his name to later editions. The fifth edition, published in 1806, added
the fictional story about young George Washington and the cherry tree. See MASON
LOCKE. WEEMS, THE LIFE AND MEMORABLE ACTIONS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 9 (5th ed.
1806).
128 Although none of the works of the ancient Cretan philosopher Epimenides
survive, the so-called Epimenides Paradox that is attributed to him consists of the
statement "AB] Cretans are liars." Technically, the Paradox dissolves unless
Epimenides is the only member of the set of Cretans. See RAYMOND M. SMULLYAN,
WHAT IS THE NAME OF THIS BOOK? 214-15 (1978). A cleaner version of the paradox is
the sentence "'I am now lying.'" See id. at 215.
129 Bayes's Theorem can be used to revise an initial probability estimate on the
basis of additional observations. See MICHAEL 0. FINtKESTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATIS-
TICS FOR LAwY'Es 75-77 (2d ed. 2001). To illustrate, suppose that your initial estimate
is that statement S has a 50% chance of being true and a 50% chance of being false.
Suppose further that there are five possible speakers, Alice, Bill, Claire, Dan, and
Edna; that four of the five (Alice through Dan) always speak the truth; and that the
remaining possible speaker, Edna, tells the truth 75% of the time. On these assump-
tions, we can analyze the problem as follows:
P(X) = ex ante probability that S is true = .50
P(X.E) = probability that S is true, given that Edna is the speaker = to be
determined
P(E.X) = probability that Edna is the speaker, given that S is true = .15
P(NOT-X) = ex ante probability that S is not true = .50
P(E.NOT-X) = probability that Edna is the speaker, given that X is not true =
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probability-of-truth estimate upward; a second whose identity, if
revealed, would cause you to reduce that probability; and a third the
revelation of whose identity would have no effect. The first speaker
clearly has a motive to reveal his identity, because in doing so he
enhances the likelihood that his message will be believed. The fact
that the actual speaker has chosen not to reveal therefore suggests
either that (1) the actual speaker is not, in fact, the first (truthful)
speaker; or (2) the speaker has other reasons, such as fear of retalia-
tion, to keep his identity secret (more on this below).13° By contrast,
the speaker with the reputation for dishonesty or poor quality work
has an obvious motive to keep her identity a secret, because in doing
so she may increase the likelihood that people will believe her state-
ment or overrate her work product. (Of course, she, like the well-
reputed speaker, may have other reasons to keep her identity a
secret.) As for the third possible speaker, whose identity means noth-
ing to you, presumably the revelation of his identity would influence
some readers-those who, unlike you, are familiar with him-either
to believe or disbelieve his statement, but you have no way of knowing
which effect would predominate. In the abstract, therefore, it is diffi-
Bayes's Theorem states that:
P(X.E) P(E I X) P(X)
P(EIX)P(X) + P(EINOT-X)P(NOT-X)
- (.15)(.5)(.15) (.5)+(1) (.5)
=.130
Thus, knowing that Edna is the speaker decreases one's probability of truth estimate
from .5 to .13. Knowing that one of the other possible speakers was the actual speaker
would, of course, increase the probability estimate to 1.0. Alternatively, suppose that
there is one chance in a million (.000001) that Edna is the speaker, given that S is
true, and two chances in a million (.000002) that Edna is the speaker, given that X is
not true. Applying Bayes's Theorem reduces the probability of truth estimate from .5
to 1/3.
Note also that a reader who knows that a work is anonymous rationally will take
the lack of an attributed source into consideration in evaluating the work's probable
truth or quality. If the work provides some clues as to the speaker's reasons for pub-
lishing anonymously, the reader may be able to assess whether the speaker is more
likely to fall into the "George" or the "Cretan" category. See infra Part IB for discus-
sion of the reasons, good and bad, for publishing anonymously. But the reader may
be uncertain how to interpret the clues, or may err in interpreting those clues. Alter-
natively, if the reader is unable to discern or presume whether "good" or "bad" rea-
sons for publishing anonymously predominate, the rational inference is to accord
anonymity no weight at all. Either way, there is a risk that the reader will over- or
underestimate the work's truth or quality, absent source attribution.
130 See infra notes 160-78 and accompanying text.
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cult to tell whether you should accord the statement less weight than
you otherwise might, simply by virtue of its being anonymous; one
rational strategy might be to consider, on the basis of textual or other
evidence, precisely why the speaker at issue may have chosen anonym-
ity.13 I In the following subpart, we will consider in greater depth what
these reasons for remaining anonymous might be; first, however, we
respond to some possible objections to our approach thus far.
The first objection to our equation of anonymous speech with
nontrademarked products is that, as Laura Heymann points out,
trademark law permits the underlying producer of a good to remain
anonymous: As long as a mark conveys the message that the product
emanates from a unique source, it is irrelevant that consumers know
the identity of that source.132 Relatively few beer drinkers may care,
for example, that a firm known as The Boston Beer Company, Inc.
produces the beer bearing the trademark "Samuel Adams"; the trade-
mark is all they need to know to obtain a beer of predictable quality.
Similarly, readers of detective novels may not be very interested in
learning that the original name of the author who wrote under the
pen name "Ed McBain" was Salvatore Lombino; 33 his pseudonym,
like a trademark, conveys useful information even while his true iden-
tity remains unknown to most readers. A trademark might therefore
be more analogous to an author's pseudonym than to his true iden-
tity. His true identity would in turn be more like a company's "trade
name," that is, the name under which the source company does busi-
ness,134 which need not be identical with its trademark. This objec-
tion is not fatal to our analysis, however. Presumably, knowledge of an
author's true identity (or of a producer's trade name) in addition to
the author's pseudonym (or a product's trademark) provides addi-
tional value to some consumers, even if most are indifferent. Literary
critics might be interested in learning more about the man behind
the McBain pseudonym, after all, even if fans are not;135 similarly, bus-
iness analysts, regulators, and home brewers might be more interested
131 See supra note 129.
132 See Heymann, supra note 2, at 1381, 1414.
133 See Marilyn Stasio, Evan Hunter, Writer Who as Ed McBain Created Police Procedu-
ral, Dies at 78, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at B10.
134 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12 (1995).
135 Donald W. Foster, Commentary, In the Name of the Author, 33 NEw LITERARY
HIST. 375, 375 (2002). To be sure, different schools of criticism manifest differing
levels of interest, or disinterest, in the details of the author's life and circumstances.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 218-23 (1998) (distinguishing New
Critics from intentionalists). We contend nevertheless that knowledge of these details
is of some use in interpreting a work, even though reasonable minds might accord
them differing weight.
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than the average drinker in learning about the company behind
Samuel Adams beer. 3 6
A second possible objection to the identity-trademark analogy is
that there is likely to be a much greater difference in quality among
an author's various works than among goods marketed under the
same trademark. Consumers rightly expect every bottle of Coca-Cola
to taste the same; but one might not expect every book by the same
author to be precisely the same in terms of aesthetic merit, accuracy,
or insight. In response to this argument, we would analogize a new
book by an existing, well regarded author to a new product bearing an
existing, well regarded trademark or brand. For example, when Coca-
Cola or Samuel Adams or any other firm markets a new product
under the so-called "family" or "house" mark, 137 consumers are likely
to draw some inferences about the quality of the new product based
upon their familiarity with the old. A consumer who has come to trust
Coca-Cola as the licensor of quality beverages is rational when she
expects a new Coca-Cola sponsored product to meet similar quality
standards, despite some possibility that her expectations will be disap-
pointed. Knowing that the product is approved by Coca-Cola enables
the consumer to draw a rational ex ante inference that she would be
unable to draw if the product were generic. Similarly, knowledge of a
well regarded author's identity does not provide a guarantee that a
new work will meet the author's previous quality standards, but it does
increase the Bayesian probability that the work will meet those stan-
dards. 153 The benefit to the reader is not absolute, but it is not trivial
either.139
136 Fortunately, the source of a trademarked product is almost never anonymous
in any strong sense. Many companies' trade names are the same as their trademarks
(e.g., Coca-Cola, Microsoft, BMW), in which case the source is not anonymous at all.
Moreover, state legislation often requires "registration of assumed or fictitious names
under which individuals or commercial entities conduct business" so as "to assist
others in identifying the owners of the businesses with whom they deal." RESTATE-
MENT (THiD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12 cmt. c. Federal and state regulations also
often require identifying information of the manufacturer to appear on or in connec-
tion with the products sold. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1500.121 (2006) (requiring that haz-
ardous substances be labeled with the manufacturer's information); 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.1 (a) (2006) (requiring that drug labeling include the manufacturer's informa-
tion). Trademark registrations are public records, and thus enable interested persons
to discover who owns a registered mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a) (2000); see also
Levmore, supra note 12, at 2206 n,21 (noting postal regulation).
137 See I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRDEMAmut AND UNFAIR COMPrTI-
TION § 7:5 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing house marks); 3 McCARTHY, supra, § 23:61 (dis-
cussing families of marks).
138 See supra note 129.
139 See Heymann, supra note 2, at 1416 & n.128.
1564 [VOL. 82:4
20071 AUTHORSHIP, AUDIENCES, AND ANONYMOUS SPEECH
Two other objections go not so much to the fit between authorial
identity and trademarks as to the rationality of relying upon either as a
proxy for quality. For surely sometimes trademarks do not provide
much useful information about product quality, and the same can be
said about attributed speech as well. Economists recognize that trade-
marks are relatively more useful for distinguishing among so-called
"experience" goods, that is, goods whose qualities are not easy to eval-
uate prior to purchase, and relatively less valuable for distinguishing
among "search" goods which consumers can evaluate in advance of
purchase on the basis of observable characteristics.1 40 In our hypo-
thetical above, the taste of a soft drink is clearly an experience good,
but other products (say, fresh fruits and vegetables) are largely search
goods, whose color, shape, and firmness (though often not taste) can
be evaluated in advance. Not surprisingly, trademarks play a less
prominent role in the market for fresh produce than in the markets
for some other goods, but they are not entirely absent either; different
grocery store chains may distinguish themselves on the basis of their
produce, and companies such as Harry & David do market themselves
as purveyors of quality fruit. 141 In any event, most goods manifest at
least some experience characteristics, even if they also exhibit some
search qualities as well; clothing, perfume, and automobiles can all be
sampled before purchase, but qualities such as durability often remain
experience characteristics. Speech shares this dual character. To be
sure, some poems, jokes, or works of music (for example) may tend
more toward the "search" end of the spectrum, in that one can quickly
sample and evaluate them without needing to know anything about
their source. But even simple works may be better appreciated if one
knows something about the author, the context in which she wrote,
her likely influences, and so on; all the more so for more complex
works.' 42 And it is often not the case that one can adequately sample
a work prior to purchase or consumption, in which case knowing
something about the author can provide useful information upon
140 See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer
Behavior, 78J. POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970).
141 Disney also has a trial program in some markets where it is testing a strategy of
branding up-market produce using a Disney character sticker. SeeJenny Wiggins, Dis-
ney Develops a Taste for Fresh Fruit, FIN. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at 1.
142 Forgeries, for example, once exposed as such, typically lose whatever critical
acclaim they previously enjoyed, even though the physical attributes of the work
remain the same. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 255-56 (2003) (discussing some possible
reasons for this phenomenon); Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1181.
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which to decide whether to purchase or consume. 143 As with other
goods and services, attribution may not always provide much informa-
tional value, but this is not to say that it never does or that it typically
does not.
Similarly, one might contest the usefulness of both trademarks
and authorial identity by noting that consumers sometimes overvalue
brand-name goods-and, presumably, brand-name authors, too. But
it hardly follows that the use of brand names is a net cost to society
rather than a net benefit. Granted, consumers occasionally pay more
for a product bearing a famous mark than for a lesser-known product
that functions equally well; consider, for example, consumers who
continue to purchase brand-name drugs even after bioequivalent
generics come on the market.1 44 But even this behavior may be
rational. Some consumers may believe, for example, that the maker
of a brand-name drug will invest more in quality control than the
maker of a generic equivalent. 145 Perhaps it is equally rational to
assume that some "brand-name" expressive works will embody small,
but potentially important, quality advantages over their lesser-known
and superficially fungible competitors. Other times, consumers may
prefer brand-name goods because of the consumptive value of the
brand name itself. People who wear designer jeans and drive Por-
sches may do so in order to communicate a message about their tastes,
status, and income that they might not be able to communicate as
effectively without these products.1 46 Perhaps we also sometimes con-
vey messages about our taste or status based upon our choice of which
authors we credit or admire. It would be at least marginally more dif-
ficult to convey such messages if anonymous authorship were the
norm.
That said, it is nevertheless quite plausible that reliance upon
authorial reputation as a proxy for quality or truth or status sometimes
143 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 142, at 117 n.51 (suggesting that books are an
"intermediate case" between search and experience goods, insofar as one can
examine a book before buying it, but the process is time-consuming and "there are
too many books to be able to sample them in this way"); Richard A. Posner, The Future
of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. Rvv. 1131, 1133-34 (1995) (noting that an
author's reputation functions as a proxy for article quality, in much the same way that
trademarks signal product quality).
144 See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per
Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 500-01 (2002) (noting that the price of brand-name
drugs sometimes goes up when generics enter the market, due to the brand loyalty
and price insensitivity of some portion of consumers).
145 See LAt)Es & POSNER, supra note 142, at 195.
146 See id. at 208-09; Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960,
969-70 (1993).
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results in our according certain works more credence 
or esteem than
they deserve-or in paying insufficient attention 
to lesser-known
authors' works.14 7 But the fact that attribution 
may enable biased
decisionmaking does not mean that it always does 
so, or that audi-
ences can never foresee and take precautions against 
their biases. For
example, some scholarly journals require anonymous submissions;
many institutions, including law schools and bar 
examiners, typically
require students taking examinations to use a 
code number so that
graders will not be able to discern the identities 
of students being
graded; and auditions for symphony orchestras 
typically are con-
ducted so that judges cannot discover the identity of performers 
until
the audition is completed. Perhaps more such 
measures would be
desirable to combat bias or otherwise force audiences 
to consider a
work or performance on the basis of its inherent 
characteristics, 148 but
again, this hardly suggests that the social costs 
of attribution routinely
outweigh the social benefits.
Finally, most of what we have said about anonymous 
speech
applies to pseudonymous speech as well, though 
with a few additional
twists. A problem unique to pseudonymous speech 
is that audiences
may be unaware that a pen name is merely a 
pseudonym that masks
the author's true identity, and thus may not discount 
the value of the
speech appropriately.
149 Even so, there are two countervailing effects
that arguably tend to make pseudonymous speech 
more reliable on
average than completely anonymous speech. 
One is that pseudony-
mous speech is often published through the intermediation 
of a pub-
lisher who is likely to know the speaker's identity. 
The publisher is, in
a sense, vouching for the speaker's credibility. 
Of course, the same
may also be true of some anonymous speech; it 
may be anonymous to
the public but not the publisher.
150 The other effect is that pseud-
onyms actually can function something like trademarks, 
as both Hey-
147 Indeed, consumers may even rely 
on the presumed characteristics of an
author, such as age, race, social class, gender, and 
so forth, as proxies for quality or
truth.
148 For example, when an author remains 
anonymous as a matter of artistic
choice, revelation of her identity might undermine 
her message and deprive audi-
ences of the opportunity to receive that message 
as intended. See infra notes 155, 171
and accompanying text; see also Heymann, supra 
note 2, at 1425 & n.153 (discussing
instances in which the audience might be 
better off not knowing the author's iden-
tity); Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1240 (discussing the 
"marketable illusions" created by
authorial anonymity); Levmore, supra note 12, at 2210 (considering 
the consequences
of deceptive use of authorial anonymity).
149 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
The same problem would attend
any other type of misattribution.
150 See Levmore, supra note 12, at 2210.
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mann and Lastowka demonstrate.
15 1 To the extent the speaker has
reputational capital invested in his pseudonym, 
that investment cre-
ates an incentive for the speaker to continue 
to produce work of pre-
dictable quality. The author's incentive 
to maximize the value
1 52 of
his authorial trademark may counteract much 
of the potential for
abuse that is inherent in pseudonymous speech.
B. The Private Benefits of Anonymity
If attribution generally is something that speech 
consumers find
valuable, it is reasonable to ask why authors 
who seek public acclaim
for their ideas and expression would ever choose 
to publish anony-
mously. We have alluded to some possible 
reasons above, but in this
subpart provide a more comprehensive list of 
the reasons that authors
may derive private value from withholding their 
identities. First, the
author may derive some internal, noninstrumental 
satisfaction from
speaking without attribution; we refer to this 
as the "Intrinsic Ratio-
nale" for anonymity. Second, the author may 
be concerned about the
private costs that she, or others whose welfare 
matters to her, may
incur if she speaks truthfully-if she presents 
her artistic vision with-
out flinching-but without the shield of anonymity. 
We refer to this
as the "Wrongful Retaliation" rationale. Third, 
the author may be
concerned about the private costs that could 
flow from speaking falsely
without the shield of anonymity; we refer to 
this as the "Justifiable
Retaliation" rationale. Fourth, the author may 
wish to conceal her
identity in order to derive some collateral benefit 
that would be more
costly to obtain were her identity revealed. 
We refer to this as the
"Collateral Benefits" rationale. Fifth, the author 
may be someone who
is perceived to be untruthful or the purveyor 
of low-quality work, but
who is in fact telling the truth or producing 
high-quality work and
wants her message to be taken seriously. We 
refer to this as the "Boy
Who Cried Wolf' rationale.
1. The Intrinsic Rationale
Anonymous speech is sometimes said to promote 
individual
autonomy and self-fulfillment
53 by enabling individuals to explore
151 See Heymann, supra note 2, at 1380; Lastowka, 
supra note 2, at 1197.
152 The "value" could be measured economically, 
or as a product of the author's
desire that the speech be persuasive, or even 
as a factor of the author's need for
affirmation.
153 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY 
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-50 (1989)
(referring to "self-realization and self-determination as the 
key first amendment val-
ues"); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM 
OF ExPRESSION 6-9 (1970) (argu-
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new ideas, new means of expression, 54 and even new identities.155
Thus, one reason for some authors to publish anonymously is that
they derive internal satisfaction from not having their true identity
revealed. An author may even believe that by publishing anonymously
she is making a political or artistic statement.15 6 This rationale may
underlie the Supreme Court's characterization of Margaret McIntyre's
decision to publish anonymously as an integral part of her freedom to
choose the content of her speech.1 57 As such, the interest is akin to
one of the "moral rights" that many nations accord to authors on the
theory that the author's infusion of her unique personality into her
artistic creations entitles her, as a matter of natural law, to a substan-
tial degree of autonomy with respect to how those creations are
presented to the public. 58 In these countries, the author is viewed as
having an inalienable right to attribution, which right embraces a sub-
sidiary right to be properly attributed as the author of that which she
ing that "freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment").
154 Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 1ARv. L. Rxv. 1130, 1131 (2000) (noting that the
Internet, with its custom of anonymous and pseudonymous speech, "alters the archi-
tecture of both identity presentation ... and social interaction").
155 Tien, supra note 18, at 120 ("[Alnonymity is more than concealing authorial
identity; speech is discursive interaction, and anonymity is useful for constituting indi-
vidual and group identity in interaction.").
156 For example, a British graffiti artist "Banksy," who has remained pseudony-
mous "'so I can do my work without being impeded by arrest,"' has gained interna-
tional recognition. Paul Vallely, Banksy: The Joker, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 23, 2006, at 48,
available at http://news.independent.co.uk/people/profiles/articlel705576.ece; see
also Anne Ferry, Anonymity: The Literary History of a Word, 33 NEw LITERARY HIST. 193,
197 (2002) (noting that in the nineteenth century, "Itihe desire of poets to escape
over-personal interpretations of their poems" spurred them to publish anonymously);
Foster, supra note 135, at 391 (citing the example of Yehiel Feiner, who wrote about
the Holocaust under a pseudonym that translates as "Prisoner," because he
"'rlefuse[d] the right to valorize his individual experience" and "spoke as the invisi-
ble man, for one and all" who were killed at Auschwitz); Heymann, supra note 2, at
1401-06 (discussing the use of authornyms for political or social reasons); Lastowka,
supra note 2, at 1222-27 (discussing the use of ghost writers as an example of the
value of authorial "licensing"). Yet another possibility is that the author believes that
anonymity is the more virtuous choice. Religious or ethical traditions may bestow
greater esteem upon anonymous contributions to charities, for example. See
Levmore, supra note 12, at 2196 n.5. A less exalted motivation for anonymous contri-
butions is that the donor may be less likely to be solicited for other worthy causes. Id.;
see also Fisk, supra note 2, at 87-88 (noting that some employers prefer that employ-
ees' authorship of software remain anonymous, so as to reduce the risk of other
potential employers luring those employees away).
157 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1994).
158 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C.
L. Rxv. 1, 6-15 (1997).
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has created, a right not to be attributed as the author of that which she
has not created, and a right to publish anonymously or under a pseu-
donym. 159 Although the United States has never fully embraced the
concept of moral rights as it is understood in some (mostly European)
countries, 160 our anonymous speech cases appear to recognize some-
thing similar to a moral right to speak anonymously-though, as
noted above, they leave unresolved the question of how much weight
to accord this interest when it comes into conflict with other social
interests.
2. Wrongful Retaliation
A second reason for speaking anonymously is that the author is
concerned about the potentially negative personal consequences of
159 See id. at 12. Of course, the author may have both intrinsic and instrumental
reasons for wishing to publish anonymously or under an assumed name. Note also
that these fights are not absolute, even in countries with robust moral rights tradi-
tions. See Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordance of Copyright Law
and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, II FomDHas INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
LJ. 601, 624-25 (2001) (citing ADOLF DiETz, DAs DROIT MORAL DES URHEBERS IM
NEUEN FRANZsisCIAEN UND DEUTSCHEN URHEBERRECHT 121 (1968)) (noting that Ger-
man law, unlike French law, requires adherence to an express contractual duty for an
author to remain anonymous, with exceptions allowed if the author must prove his
authorship or if the work enjoys unforeseeable success).
160 The U.S. has incorporated some aspects of moral rights protection into its
copyright and unfair competition laws over the past generation, however. See Cotter,
supra note 158, at 15-27. In 1990, for example, Congress amended the Copyright Act
to include a new Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). See Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.). VARA confers upon the authors of qualifying "works of visual art," see 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of "work of visual art"), a right of attribution, see id.
§§ 106A(a)(1)-(2), but it does not explicitly endow authors with a right to publish
anonymously or pseudonymously. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 1037 n.88 (1994). Nevertheless, U.S. copyright law has permitted the registra-
tion of anonymous and pseudonymous works for close to 100 years, see Act of Mar. 4,
1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (repealed 1976) (stating
that the copyright term ran for twenty-eight years from the date of publication,
whether the work bore the author's true name or was published anonymously or pseu-
donymously), though prior to 1909 the copyright status of anonymous works was pre-
carious. See STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT (May 31-June 2, 1905), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HisTORY
OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT pt. C, at i, 40 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds.,
1976) (containing the statement of Register of Copyrights Thorvald Solberg that, as
of 1905, an author who wished to obtain federal copyright protection and to remain
anonymous had to arrange for another to file the registration as copyright proprie-
tor); 1 PATRY, supra, at 20 (stating that some early state copyright laws declined to
extend protection to anonymous or pseudonymous works).
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speaking truthfully and with attribution. This interest may be impli-
cated in a number of recurring situations. One common example is
the whistleblower who reports on corporate or government wrongdo-
ing despite some risk of incurring retaliation.I61 Similarly, police
informants may prefer to remain anonymous to avoid harms to them-
selves, their families, or to other informants whose identities might be
compromised. Employees who publish writings that displease their
employers risk being fired,1 62 and people who speak out against cor-
porate policies risk becoming SLAPP targets. 1 63 The nuisance of hav-
ing to defend oneself from such a suit, even if the suit proves
unsuccessful on the merits, creates an incentive for would-be critics to
voice their opinions anonymously. 164 And even when the potential
consequences are of a lesser magnitude, some speakers may simply
feel they can be more candid if allowed to express their opinions
anonymously. In many academic disciplines, for example, peer
reviews of scholarship are anonymous for precisely this reason. A
reviewer forced to disclose her identity may feel inhibited from speak-
ing critically about a person or institution with whom or with which
161 For discussion of the piecemeal nature of whistleblower protection laws, see
DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESIrr, WHISTLEBLOWING 67-75 (2d ed. 2004).
162 Government employees have First Amendment rights when speaking "as citi-
zens on matters of public concern," but not when speaking "pursuant to their official
duties." See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959-60 (2006). The First Amend-
ment protects both the autonomy interest of the employee when speaking as a citizen,
and the public interest in receiving information. See id. at 1959. ("[W]idespread costs
may arise when dialogue is repressed."); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82
(2004) (per curiam) (stating that the public has an "interest in receiving informed
opinion" (emphasis added)).
163 See Pring, supra note 108, at 6-9 (summarizing a U.S. study on the existence,
causes, and effects of SLAPPs). While many state legislatures have enacted "anti-
SLAPP" legislation in the past fifteen years, Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV Cases:
Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to Copyright Protection Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 603, 609-11 (2005), companies are now merely shifting their strategies,
and in some cases are using anti-SLAPP legislation itself as a sword. See id. at 607.
164 Alternatively, the speaker may fear retaliation that is lawful but questionable
for policy reasons. To cite one example, W. Mark Felt might have been subject to
prosecution had his role as "Deep Throat" been revealed at the time of the Watergate
scandal. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000) (criminalizing the theft, conveyance or disposal
of public records or things of value). If Felt had exposed such information today, he
could also be prosecuted under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000), or found in
contempt of court under the federal grand jury secrecy rule, FED. R. CruM. P. 6(e). See
Timothy Noah, Were Felt's Leaks Illegal?, SLA-IrF, June 1, 2005, http://www.slate.com/
id/2120069/index.htrnl. Ironically, President Nixon also took advantage of anonym-
ity by planting pseudonymous newspaper articles praising his administration. See Fos-
ter, supra note 135, at 381; Heymann, supra note 2, at 1408 n.106.
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she will share future professional contacts. 65 Other times, speakers
may simply wish not to be harassed with follow-up questions or
solicitations. 16 6
Alternatively, authors may wish to avoid the shame, humiliation,
or social ostracism that might result from disclosure of their identities.
To vindicate this interest, courts in some rare instances permit liti-
gants-the putative authors, or at least authorizers, of the papers filed
on their behalf-to proceed without revealing their identities, as in
Roe v. Wade.167 More generally, absent anonymity, an author may feel
constrained by her class,' 68 her gender,16 9 or her professional status,
165 Such records are often confidential, but they are potentially discoverable in
litigation. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 192 (1990).
166 See Levmore, supra note 12, at 2193.
167 410 U.S. 113, 120 n.4 (1973) (noting without comment that the petitioner's
name was a pseudonym). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires every plead-
ing to include the caption of the case, including the parties' names, and Rule 17(a)
requires that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. See
FED. R. Cry. P. 10(a), 17(a). In cases implicating "significant privacy interests," how-
ever-principally challenges to laws regulating such matters as sexual behavior, birth
control, and abortion-courts sometimes permit parties to litigate under pseud-
onyms, though even in this context often on the condition that the party's real name
be disclosed to the court and to the defense. W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171, 1172
(10th Cir. 2001) (citing Nat'l Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1245
(10th Cir. 1989)); see also Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678,
684-87 (lth Cir. 2001) (recognizing the right of a plaintiff in an abortion case to
proceed anonymously, provided that her name be disclosed to defendants for discov-
ery purposes). The practice of not publishing the names of alleged rape victims or
underage criminal defendants, either in news accounts or in reported cases, is based
upon a similar rationale, although in these instances both parties would be aware of
the identities of the alleged victim and of the defendant, and their names would usu-
ally be used in open court. And sometimes fear of outright retaliation, notjust ostra-
cism, appears to predominate. See Doe v. Barrow County, 219 F.R.D. 189, 192-94
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (permitting anonymous challenge to Ten Commandments display).
168 See Ferry, supra note 156, at 195 (noting that in the seventeenth century "it was
considered altogether improper for gentlemen and persons of rank to appear in print
as poets, so that (those] who wanted to display their wit as a way of advancing them-
selves in courtly circles were driven to publish verse unsigned but under fancy dis-
guises that could be seen through"); Foster, supra note 135, at 379 (observing that in
early modem England, "[p]ersons of rank . . . were more heavily invested in their
personal name than in their literary product").
169 "The motivations for publishing anonymously.., have included an aristocratic
or a gendered reticence, religious self-effacement, anxiety over public exposure, fear
of prosecution, hope of an unprejudiced reception, and the desire to deceive." Rob-
ert J. Griffin, Anonymity and Authorship, 30 NEW LITERARY HIsT. 877, 885 (1999).
Another example that might fall within this category is that of a speaker who pub-
lishes anonymously or under a pseudonym to avoid the audience's perceived irra-
tional bias. As Levmore and Heymann both note, for example, women authors often
resorted to male-sounding pseudonyms (e.g., George Sand) so that their works would
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or by the ideas or opinions of her employer. An author of erotic sto-
ries, for example, may prefer to keep her identity as a high school
physics teacher secret-perhaps because of potential retaliation from
her employer, but also because of the potential for embarrassment
and breakdown of classroom discipline that may otherwise result.170
Nor is the need for anonymity necessarily limited to narrow personal
interests; one might be motivated to protect the group or nation to
which one belongs instead. For example, when George Kennan pub-
lished his famous Foreign Affairs article (under the pseudonym "X") in
1947, heralding what came to be known as the U.S. containment pol-
icy against the Soviet Union, he requested anonymity due to his
employment at the time with the U.S. State Department.171
In all of the preceding examples, anonymity not only reduces the
speaker's private costs of speaking but also may be seen to advance
two important social goals as well. First, anonymity encourages contri-
butions to the marketplace of ideas by eliminating barriers both to
speaking (such as age, social status, or ethnicity) and to listening
(such as fear of social censure or geographical isolation). 172 Protect-
ing anonymity helps those with inside information sound the alarm
against threats to public welfare, and it helps citizens to check abuses
by powerful institutions, corporations, and actors. 173 Second, anony-
be taken seriously within a male-oriented culture. See Heymann, supra note 2, at
1398-1400; Levmore, supra note 12, at 2208-09, 2213-14.
170 See also Heymann, supra note 2, at 1404-05 (providing an example of one pro-
fessor who admittedly wrote mystery novels under an authornym for fear of being
rejected for tenure).
171 See, e.g., WALTER ISAACSON & EvAN THOMAS, THE WISE MEN 383-85 (1986).
172 It does this in part by encouraging speakers to contribute to public discourse
without fear. Kang observes that "individuals are less fearful in cyberspace" because
their "physical body is never at risk." See Kang, supra note 154, at 1161. Anonymous
speech also encourages audiences to listen without allowing the identity of the
speaker to prejudice their interpretation of his message. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at
896 (arguing that the widespread use of anonymity and pseudonymity on the Internet
"disguises status indicators such as race, class, gender, ethnicity, and age, which allow
elite speakers to dominate real-world discourse"); Post, supra note 42, at 640 ("In
most circumstances we attend as carefully to the social status of a speaker, and to the
social context of her words, as we do to the bare content of her communication.").
Lee Bollinger offers another argument that, if true, applies equally well to anonymous
speech; he contends that one of the functions of the First Amendment is to make us
more tolerant of others by bringing us into contact with diverse ideas and viewpoints.
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 50 (1986).
173 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs.J. 521, 527. Anonymity also enables speakers to initiate social movements
to challenge repressive regimes. See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent
Social Movements and the First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 119,
163-70 (2001).
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mous speech promotes democratic self-governance, which Alexander
Meiklejohn and others have argued is the ultimate aim of the First
Amendment 174 The inclusion of voices in public debate that might
not otherwise be heard, particularly the voices of those with less power
and influence, makes public discourse and ultimately our system of
government more democratic. By increasing the likelihood that
unconventional perspectives will be brought to bear on important
social problems, anonymity may help generate creative solutions. And
even if it does not, citizens who participate in public discourse are
more likely to seek out information about important policy issues and
thus to become more capable of exercising democratic self-
governance.
3. Justifiable Retaliation
A darker side of anonymity is revealed, however, when we con-
sider various other reasons why authors may wish to speak without
attribution. One prominent reason is that the speaker wants to con-
ceal his identity because he fears the negative consequences of having
spoken falsely. The disgruntled employee may wish to spread lies
about his employer with impunity; the anonymous reviewer may wish
to settle a personal score; a confidential informant or spy may wish to
sow the seeds of discontent or control public opinion. More gener-
ally, the pathological liar (Epimenides's Cretan in our earlier exam-
ple) 175 is likely to be better off speaking anonymously than with
attribution; unaware of the liar's true identity, people may accord his
anonymous speech more credit than, on balance, it is due.1 76 Thus
Schopenhauer may have been exaggerating when he called anony-
174 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs."); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 37-41 (1948) (arguing that speech not relevant to
self-government is protected by the Due Process Clause, but not by the First Amend-
ment); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv.
245, 253-56; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 255, 313-14 (1992)
(noting the First Amendment reflects a "structural commitment to deliberative
democracy").
175 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
176 In addition, it may be more difficult to track down and punish a truly anony-
mous speaker. Whether a rule forbidding anonymity would give rise to substantial
social benefits for this reason alone, all other things being equal, is nevertheless diffi-
cult to say. People who wished to speak falsely might simply flout a rule requiring
them to disclose their true identities. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 352-53 (1995) (questioning the difficulty of enforcing bans on dissemi-
nating false documents against anonymous authors as opposed to wrongdoers using
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mous speech "the refuge for all literary and journalistic rascality," but
he cogently stated the case for author attribution as a curb to abuse:
[W]hen a man publicly proclaims through the far-sounding trum-
pet of the newspaper, he should be answerable for it, at any rate
with his honor, if he has any; and if he has none, let his name neu-
tralize the effect of his words. And since even the most insignificant
person is known in his own circle, the result of such a measure
would be to put an end to two-thirds of the newspaper lies, and to
restrain the audacity of many a poisonous tongue. 177
Nearly two hundred years after Schopenhauer, the Internet has
come to exacerbate this dark side of anonymity due to its "disinhibit-
ing effect" on many speakers. Studies show that even when an
Internet user is not anonymous and knows the recipient of his e-mail
message, the speaker is more likely to be disinhibited when engaged
in "computer mediated communication" than in other types of com-
munications.178 The technology separates the speaker from the
immediate consequences of her speech, perhaps (falsely) lulling her
to believe that there will be no consequences. Since the Internet mag-
nifies the number of anonymous speakers, it also magnifies the likeli-
hood of false and abusive speech.
4. Collateral Benefits
A fourth possibility, related to the preceding one, is that the
speaker wishes to conceal his identity in order to enhance the
probability of obtaining some collateral benefit to which he is not
entitled, or which could otherwise be obtained only at higher cost.' 79
false names), with id. at 382 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a signing require-
ment would significantly deter authors from lying).
177 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE ART OF LITERATURE 77 (1960).
178 See Adam N. Joinson, Disinhibition and the Internet, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
INTERNET 75, 79-81 (Jayne Gachenback ed., 2d ed. 2007); Danah Boyd, Faceted Id/
Entity: Managing Representation in a Digital World 30 (Aug. 9, 2002) (unpublished
M.S. thesis, Brown University), available at http://www.danah.org/papers/Thesis.Fac-
etedldentity.pdf ("[I1n anonymous situations, people's lack of fear of retribution or
sense of other people undermines the effectiveness of social regulation."); M.E.
Kabay, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace 10 (Mar. 1998) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www2.norwich.edu/mkabay/overviews/anonpseudo.
pdf (arguing that anonymity lowers peoples "normal inhibitions" because "the dein-
dividuation of anonymous people lowers their self-reflective propensities").
179 To be sure, the First Amendment does not protect fraud: for example, using
fake identification to obtain liquor or cigarettes, to register to vote, or to obtain a
driver's license or passport. Cf Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177,
187-88 (2004) (upholding requirement that persons detained on "reasonable suspi-
cion" of criminal activity identify themselves to police). Clearly, the state may require
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To cite one example, one can imagine a book reviewer 
who wishes to
conceal his identity because people would be more 
likely to conclude
that the review is biased if the author's identity were 
known. History is
indeed replete with examples of writers who 
published favorable
reviews of their own work or other accomplishments, 
either anony-
mouslyi8 0 or under pseudonyms.
181 Alternatively, a speaker may wish
to conceal his identity as the funding source 
for political advertise-
ments in order to deflect suspicion, post-election, 
that the prevailing
candidate is repaying the funder from the public 
fisc. Or consider the
copyright infringement cases discussed in Part 
I.C. When I transmit
copyrighted materials to another person, I 
may well be expressing
something true and valuable (e.g., "I like this music," or 
"I think you
will enjoy this song"). But the main reasons I choose to 
transmit
anonymously may be to shield myself and the recipient 
from copyright
liability, assuming the transmission is without consent 
of the copyright
owner, and to induce future exchanges.
Arguably all of the phenomena described above 
could simply be
listed as further examples under the heading 'Justifiable 
Retaliation."
We separate them out only to make the point that, in these 
instances,
the speaker may well be telling the truth: He may 
believe that his work
is admirable, or that his political party deserves 
to win, or that the file-
shared music is worth listening to.
18 2 (Depending on the circum-
stances, he may not face retaliation either, other 
than in the soft sense
of suspicion or disbelief; though in the copyright 
and breach-of-confi-
dentiality cases the penalties could be much more 
serious.) The pub-
lic nevertheless also has some interest in knowing 
the identity of the
disclosure of identity in order to obtain a wide 
range of government benefits, without
incurring liability for compelling speech. Our 
examples above, however, touch upon
the publication of expressive speech to obtain 
collateral benefits such as public
acclaim or political favors.
180 See, e.g., PAUL ZWEIG, WALT WHiTMAN: THE MAXING 
OF THE POET 271-73 (1984)
(discussing Walt Whitman's anonymous self-reviews).
181 STEVEN D. LEVTT & STEPHENJ. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 
121-22 (rev. ed. 2006)
(discussing an author's favorable statements about himself 
under the pseudonym
"Mary Rosh"). One might publish an anonymous review 
of another's work for similar
reasons, that is, to minimize the suspicion of bias 
(either for or against the author).
An author's publication of anonymous reviews also 
might be compared to publishing
a study without revealing that it is being funded 
by a person or entity that stands to
benefit from a particular conclusion.
182 Another example might be that of a doctor, 
lawyer, or other fiduciary who
anonymously discloses truthful, but confidential, 
information about a patient or cli-
ent. Whether the motivation was to attain some collateral 
benefit or to settle a score,
the author's interest in anonymity is clearly at odds 
with the perceived social benefits
of enforcing legal duties of confidentiality.
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source, so as to judge for itself the credibility of the review, or the
potential for political corruption or other rent-seeking behavior; or,
assuming that the application of copyright liability to file-sharing is on
balance socially desirable, to discourage the unauthorized transmis-
sion of copyrighted works.
5. The Boy Who Cried Wolf
A fifth possibility is that the speaker prefers anonymity because
she perceives that the public will accord her speech less value-to the
public's own detriment, as well as to the speaker's-if it realizes her
identity. Everyone but the wolf, after all, would have been better off
had the boy in Aesop's fable been credited on the one occasion on
which he spoke the truth about the lupine menace. As noted above,
when the public perceives the probability of a given speaker speaking
the truth as being below the average for speakers generally, the
speaker is likely better off speaking anonymously than he would be if
he revealed his true identity. In this instance, however, withholding
the speaker's identity also may protect the public against (rationally)
underestimating the truth-value of the statement.
III. TOWARD A NORMATIVE STANDARD
The analysis presented above suggests, among other things, that
attribution often provides valuable information for speech consumers,
and accordingly that audiences will tend to discount speech from an
undisclosed source. Some authors nevertheless prefer to publish
anonymously, either because of the intrinsic satisfaction anonymity
gives them, or because they believe that anonymity shields them from
adverse consequences that they would suffer if their identities were
known. Yet our positive analysis standing alone leads to few if any
clear normative conclusions concerning the appropriate legal
response to anonymous speech. In crafting a normative analysis,
therefore, we draw upon traditional First Amendment principles to
provide some weight to the various interests that our normative analy-
sis has identified as relevant. We argue below that existing First
Amendment law generally assumes that more speech is better than
less, even if a necessary byproduct of more speech is the production of
more harmful speech, and that audiences for core First Amendment
speech are largely rational and capable of self-governance. Whether
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or not these assumptions are demonstrably true,
18 3 they are deeply
enmeshed in our constitutional system, and rules 
that comport with
them are more likely to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. Taking
these assumptions as our starting point, we 
can begin to devise stan-
dards for the regulation of anonymous speech, 
based upon the pre-
mise that the potential chilling effects of compulsory 
disclosure are
real and must be given substantial weight, and 
that audience self-help
is, in general, an adequate if imperfect substitute 
for compulsory dis-
closure. We develop this analysis and apply it 
to some current matters
of controversy in the following Part.
A. Assessing the Social Costs and Benefits of Anonymous Speech
One way of further analyzing the social costs 
and benefits
described in Part I is to consider the consequences 
of a hypothetical
rule that required speakers to disclose their 
identities under all cir-
cumstances. An obvious consequence of a rule 
forbidding anonymity
would be that some authors who crave anonymity 
for intrinsic reasons
might prefer not to publish at all. On the other 
hand, authors who
speak anonymously only to avoid wrongful 
retaliation could be
induced to speak with attribution if retaliation 
could be deterred in
other ways. Indeed, for this class of speakers, 
a system that simultane-
ously compelled disclosure of authorial identity 
and effectively pre-
vented retaliation would be preferable to one 
that merely protected
anonymity, because (1) speech consumers would stand 
to benefit
from knowing the speaker's identity, and (2) the speaker 
would stand
a better chance of being taken seriously, all other 
things being equal.
Reality suggests, however, that retaliation (let alone mere 
social ostra-
cism) can never be prevented with 100% effectiveness, and 
thus that a
rule forbidding anonymity almost certainly 
would discourage some
apprehensive speakers from coming forward. 
Stronger penalties
against retaliation nevertheless could ameliorate 
some of the negative
consequences of a nonanonymity rule (though such 
penalties could
give rise to other negative consequences such 
as an increase in the
cost of false positives, i.e., erroneous determinations 
that wrongful
retaliation has occurred). In addition, a rule forbidding 
anonymity
might cause the public to accord too little weight 
to truthful warnings
emanating from speakers such as the Boy Who 
Cried Wolf-though
potential wolf-criers who recognize this problem 
in advance would
have a marginally greater incentive not to 
develop a reputation as
183 They may well be false in some commonplace 
settings. See Derek E. Bambauer,
Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, 
and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of
Ideas, 77 U. CoLo. L. Ruv. 649, 704-05 (2006).
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wolf-criers in the first place. A rule requiring them to disclose their
identifies therefore could conceivably have a net positive effect on the
dissemination of truthful information, at least in the long run.18 4
On the other side of the ledger, a rule that required speakers to
disclose their identities would deter some members of the third class
of anonymous speakers-those who fear justifiable retaliation-from
coming forward. But this result might appear to be a positive social
good, to the extent this class of speakers gives rise to greater social
losses than private benefits. 18 5 Moreover, a rule protecting this class
against retaliation would make no sense, even if it were feasible, pre-
cisely because such a rule would immunize the class from liability for
defamation, product disparagement, and other conduct that the legal
system (rightly, in our view) condemns. A disclosure rule also would
require speakers in the fourth class, those seeking collateral benefits,
to reveal their identities-and this too would appear to be a social
good, if, for example, it would enable speech consumers to draw
appropriate inferences about the credibility of the speech at issue.1 86
What the preceding analysis suggests, unfortunately, is that any
attempt to tally up the social costs and benefits of anonymous speech
is destined to be indeterminate; or, to put it another way, that our
positive analysis standing alone leads to few if any clear normative con-
clusions. On the one hand, it is conceivable (though, we think,
unlikely) that a rule forbidding anonymity altogether would maximize
social welfare, even when the potential chilling effect with respect to
speakers falling into categories one and two-those who crave ano-
nymity for intrinsic reasons, and those who fear wrongful retaliation-
is taken into account. Surely some of these speakers would continue
to speak out, even at some risk or discomfort to themselves; those risks
could be reduced somewhat by increasing the penalties for retaliation,
and whatever social losses that would nevertheless ensue would have
184 An analogy can be drawn to the firm that wants consumers to recognize its
trademark as symbolizing a consistent level of quality. See supra note 125.
185 But see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) ("Even a false
statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it
brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error."' (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LBERTY 15 (1947))).
186 This is not to say that all cases arguably falling into this or other categories
would be easy cases. Speakers may have mixed motives for retaining anonymity-or it
may be difficult to discern what the speaker's motive is at all. Political speech in
particular may be difficult to disentangle. On the one hand, speakers may rightly fear
retaliation for speaking their minds in a public forum. On the other, knowing who
has funded a political advertisement provides some insight into who is likely to be
showered with benefits flowing from the public fisc, if the candidate whose position
aligns with the advertisement comes to power.
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to be balanced against the gains flowing from a reduction in the quan-
tity of harmful speech. 8 7 For surely more harmful speech and other
rent-seeking behavior would either be deterred or more easily
detected if anonymity were forbidden; perhaps, then, the benefits of a
nonanonymity rule would outweigh the costs, as measured by some
felicific calculus. On the other hand, a regime that forbade anonym-
ity altogether might seem creepy, if not outright totalitarian. And it
may well be the case-in fact, we suspect that it probably is the case-
that a reasonable social welfare calculus cuts in favor of some sort of
proanonymity norm, if we assume that (1) substantial numbers of
speakers falling into categories one and two would be deterred from
coming forward under a mandatory disclosure rule, and (2) audiences
can protect themselves from many' 88 of the potential harms of anony-
mous speech by resort to the self-help option, i.e., by not giving anony-
mous speech as much credit as attributed speech. 18 9 Exactly how
strong the proanonymity norm must be, however, assuming that some
version of a proanonymity norm is welfare-enhancing at all, is hardly
187 Indeed, whistleblowers, informants, and other would-be truth-tellers often do
have to reveal their identities eventually, for example, if they are called to testify in
court. Due process is surely sufficiently weighty to overcome the speaker's interest in
anonymity-which simply shows that the strong version of the right to speak anony-
mously, which some might read into McIntyre, cannot be the last word. Moreover, as
suggested in the text above, government sometimes does try to protect nona-
nonymous whistleblowers from retaliation-for example, through anti-SLAPP legisla-
tion, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 25.16 (West Supp. 2007); witness protection
programs, see Witness Security Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521-3528 (2000);
and rules protecting the identity of confidential tipsters under some circumstances,
see, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938) (stating that, in a criminal
case, disclosure of an informer's identity is forbidden "unless essential to the
defense"). Where such protections are in place, the social interest in permitting ano-
nymity is reduced as well. To the extent audiences may benefit from artistically-moti-
vated anonymity, however, see supra notes 156, 172, that benefit would be lost under a
nonanonymity regime.
188 Concededly, not all audience members will respond reasonably to speech by
an unknown author, as the prevalence of sparn e-mails suggests. After all, if no one
responded to the often-pseudonymous offers of sexual enhancement or stock market
tips, the sparn would stop coming.
189 Here, the rationale in favor of anonymity is similar to that which underlies
copyright and some other forms of intellectual property protection: that, while copy-
right may give rise to a variety of social costs, on balance it creates a surplus of social
benefits by encouraging the production and publication of works of authorship that
otherwise would not be produced or published. The rationale is also similar to that
underlying various evidendary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege.
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the sort of thing that can be determined with scientific precision.
Strictly speaking, the analysis remains indeterminate.190
We nevertheless contend that the analysis is useful in several
respects. First, it shows that implicit tradeoffs will occur, whether we
desire them or not, and whatever the rule society adopts happens to
be. A rule that provides strong protection to anonymous speech will
result in more harmful speech, whereas a rule that provides weak pro-
tection threatens to chill a good deal of core speech. We may not
know which effect predominates, but it is useful to recognize that
some socially desirable consequences will be forgone, no matter which
rule prevails. The analysis also encourages us to consider other ways
(such as increased reliance upon self-help or the adoption of mea-
sures to prevent retaliation) of reducing the anticipated but inevitable
negative consequences that are likely to flow from whatever rule is
adopted. Second, the analysis suggests that, to the extent that social
welfare considerations play at least some role in the debate, the prem-
ises implicit in existing law can be used to craft presumptions about
whether the benefits or harms of anonymous speech are likely to
predominate under various possible standards. We elaborate upon
this point in the following subpart.
B. First Amendment Presumptions
Traditional First Amendment theory helps to fill the gaps left by
the positive analysis by providing two important premises: first, that
audiences are capable of rationally assessing the truth, quality, and
other characteristics of core speech, and second, that more speech is
generally preferable to less. Both premises are open to debate.191 But
both have a long and distinguished pedigree and are unlikely to be
displaced from the pantheon of general First Amendment principles
190 Indeed, the problems with a purely utilitarian analysis of anonymous speech go
beyond mere indeterminacy. Whether the costs and benefits of anonymous speech
are even commensurable with respect to one another is debatable: As we suggested
above, for example, if the autonomy interests in support of a right to speak anony-
mously are worthy of respect, how exactly does one determine the optimal tradeoff in
return for a reduction in harmful speech? More importantly, and as others before us
have noted, the social welfare approach appears inconsistent with a good deal of
existing First Amendment jurisprudence (even if, as we would argue, it captures some
aspects of thatjurisprudence). Much speech may be of little value, or even positively
harmful, but few accounts of the First Amendment make these observations para-
mount, or even relevant under all circumstances. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom
of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YAE L.J. 1, 20-24 (2002).
191 See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IowA L. REv. 885, 928 (2006)
(citing empirical studies "demonstrat[ing) citizens' lack of political knowledge," but
observing that public choice theory explains why "the public's ignorance is rational").
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anytime soon. Thus, anonymity norms that take these principles as
starting points will fit comfortably within the existing First Amend-
ment framework, and reliance on these principles will avoid the
impasse that otherwise arises due to the unquantifiable nature of the
costs and benefits of anonymous speech.
1. Audiences Are Rational
A critical factor in weighing the value of the right to speak anony-
mously against other important rights and interests is how audiences
respond to anonymous speech. Traditional First Amendment juris-
prudence does not address the issue directly, despite the fact that its
dominant metaphor, the "marketplace of ideas," entails an implicit
theory of audience response.1 92 Oliver Wendell Holmes, who
together with Louis Brandeis articulated the philosophical foundation
of modern First Amendment theory,1 93 introduced the marketplace of
ideas metaphor into First Amendment jurisprudence. Holmes
asserted in Abrams v. United States'94 that "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market."' 95 Holmes's assertion is a tenet of modern First Amendment
jurisprudence, but it only has credence if the "consumers" in the mar-
ketplace of ideas are shrewd evaluators of information circulating in
that market. Consumers in a market pick and choose what is valuable,
and their aggregate decisions drive purveyors of worthless goods (or
information) out of the market. Yet marketplace theory only works if
consumers are capable of thinking critically and exercising autonomy
to discern what is valuable and what is not. 96 Extending the analogy,
if truth (whether Truth with a capital "T" or some more contingent
notion of truth) is to emerge from the marketplace of ideas, the con-
sumers of ideas must be capable of exercising their critical faculties to
separate the wheat from the chaff, the valuable (by each consumer's
own lights) from the valueless.
Holmes recognized that the operation of the marketplace of
ideas relies on the rationalism of American citizens. Abrams involved
the prosecution of five Russian socialist immigrants for distributing
192 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
193 See MARc A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 7-12 (7th ed. 2005).
194 250 U.S. 616.
195 Id. at 630 (HolmesJ, dissenting).
196 See M. Neil Browne et al., The Shared Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market
System, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 436 (2006) ("The key to market optimality is the
presumed existence of the calculating, well-informed, intensely rational consumer in
a context where power relationships permit the rationality to function freely.").
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pamphlets opposing U.S. involvement in World War 1.197 Although
Holmes had nothing but contempt for the "creed" espoused by the
defendants, "these poor and puny anonymities," 98 he believed that
the government had failed to establish that their speech hindered the
U.S. war effort.199 Employing what would come to be known as the
clear and present danger test,200 Holmes concluded that the defend-
ants' speech did not present an imminent threat of "immediate" harm
precisely because a rational audience would discount what the defend-
ants had written; "[o]nly the emergency that makes it immediately
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants
making any exception to the [First Amendment]."201 A rational and
skeptical audience, if given time for deliberation, can discuss and ulti-
mately see through "evil counsels," thereby eliminating their dangers
without resort to government regulation.202
Justice Brandeis further articulated this rationalist conception of
public discourse. 20 3 Brandeis firmly believed that the forces of "rea-
son as applied through public discussion" would ameliorate poten-
tially dangerous speech.20 4 According to Brandeis, "[o]nly an
emergency can justify repression"20 5 of speech, even speech the State
believes to be "false and fraught with evil consequence." 20 6 In ordi-
197 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616-17 (majority opinion).
198 Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 628-29.
200 Justice Brandeis further refined the test in Whitney v. California:
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Vincent Blasi has called Bran-
deis's opinion in Whitney "arguably the most important essay ever written . . . on the
meaning of the first amendment." Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of
Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv.
653, 668 (1988).
201 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31 (Holmes, ., dissenting).
202 As scholar G. Edward White has noted, Holmes, despite his famous skepticism
about human nature, believed that "humans are inherently rational beings." G.
Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputa-
tions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 576, 579 n.11 (1995); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Branden-
burg and the United States' War on Incitement Abroad: Defending a Double Standard, 37
WAKE FolsrsT L. REv. 1009, 1017-27 (2002) (discussing the intellectual contributions
of Holmes and Brandeis to modern First Amendment theory).
203 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
204 Id. at 375-76.
205 Id. at 377.
206 Id. at 374.
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nary circumstances, the State must rely on its citizens to "expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies [of dangerous speech],
to avert the evil by the processes of education." 20 7 Brandeis, like
Holmes, preferred the correction of evil speech via public discussion
rather than state coercion, viewing state coercion not only as unneces-
sary, but also as a threat to citizen autonomy, democratic participa-
tion, and the search for truth.20 8
This faith in rationalism permeates First Amendment jurispru-
dence. 20 9 To list just a few examples, the Supreme Court adapted the
test for punishing speech that incites violence directly from Holmes's
clear and present danger test, and the incitement test assumes that
audiences can avoid the dangers of inciting speech by employing their
common sense.2 10 The Supreme Court made this point abundantly
clear in the incitement case Dennis v. United States2 11: "[T]he basis of
the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech,
propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in
the wisest governmental policies."2 1 2 This same assumption is the
basis of the Court's prohibition of fighting words, which include only
those expressions that spur the listener to violence before he has time
for rational thought.213
Defamation law also strongly reflects the Supreme Court's faith in
rationalism. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,214 the landmark case
207 Id. at 377.
208 See Lidsky, supra note 202, at 1023-24.
209 This Article makes no claim about original intent, but Thomas Jefferson's First
Inaugural Address displays a rationalist bent: "If there be any among us who would
wish to dissolve this Union or change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed
as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where rea-
son is left free to combat it." Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1801), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc.
No. 101-10, at 13, 15; see also Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4,
1822), in THE COMPLETE MADISON 337, 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("[A] people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives."); Sharon K. Sandeen, In for a Calf Is Not Always in for a Cow: An
Analysis of the Constitutional Right of Anonymity as Applied to Anonymous E-Commerce, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527, 581 n.224 (2002) (noting that Founding-era leaders such
as Benjamin Franklin believed that freedom of expression was properly limited by the
rights of other individuals).
210 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969). The incitement test has
been adapted to the tort context as well. For thoughtful discussion, see David A.
Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAE FOREST L. REv. 957 (2002).
211 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
212 Id. at 503.
213 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
214 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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"constitutionalizing" defamation law, the Court explicitly quoted Jus-
tice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Whitney v. California for the
proposition:
"'Those who won our independence believed... that public discus-
sion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental princi-
ple of the American government.... Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law-the argument of force in its worst form.' 2 15
Yet the Sullivan Court did not paint an idealized portrait of pub-
lic discussion. The Court recognized that "debate on public issues"
will "include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials," as well as "half-truths,"
"misinformation," "exaggeration," "vilification," and "false state-
ment[s] ."216 The Court nonetheless held that the State may only pun-
ish defamatory falsehoods about public officials when the speaker
knows or recklessly disregards the falsity of his words. Thus, the State
may punish lies about public officials, but not merely negligent false-
hoods. The Sullivan Court based its holding in part on the inevitabil-
ity of "erroneous statement.., in free debate" and the chilling effect
that would result were such statements to form the basis for large tort
verdicts.21 7 However, Sullivan also rests on the premise that public
officials will not suffer unduly as a result of the inevitable false state-
ment. For this premise to be realized, however, the public must be
capable of sorting through the "half-truths" and "misinformation" to
glean the foundations of "enlightened opinion." As the Court wrote,
a paramount First Amendment value is ensuring that public discourse
is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 218 but this kind of discourse
can only benefit citizens who are capable of exercising their critical
faculties to ferret out valuable information.
This same reliance on the audience to apply its critical faculties
lies at the heart of the public figure/private figure distinction in defa-
mation.219 This distinction rests largely on the fact that public figures,
as speakers, have more access than other speakers to the marketplace
of ideas, and can protect themselves from the harm of defamation by
215 Id. at 270 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1927) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
216 Id. at 270-73.
217 Id. at 271-72.
218 Id. at 270.
219 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (noting that public
figures have access to the media to rebut defamatory falsehoods, and using this to
justify, in part, forcing them to prove actual malice before recovering for
defamation).
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employing "self-help-using available opportunities to contradict the
lie or correct the error."220 Public figures, in other words, have more
ability than other speakers to win over the public in the "competition
of ... ideas." 221 If the audience is allowed to hear both sides, it can
rationally determine the truth of the matter for itself. Thus, public
figures must show a high standard of fault in order to recover for defa-
mation. 222 Private figures, unable to use self-help as effectively to rem-
edy defamation, receive more legal solicitude and are able to recover
damages under much less stringent standards. The constitutional les-
son to be drawn seems to be that the First Amendment prefers self-
help remedies to state coercion. Put another way, the constitutional
preference is for requiring victims of potentially harmful speech to
mitigate that harm by engaging the critical faculties of the audience;
the audience can then discern the truth from the competing claims,
at least in the realm of speech that lies at the core of the First
Amendment.
2. More Is Better
The presumption that audiences will respond rationally to speech
is integrally related to a second fundamental presumption in First
Amendment jurisprudence, namely, that truth is best gathered "'out
of a multitude of tongues."' 223 This proposition, too, is debatable.
Speech from a multitude of tongues may be diverse, but it also may be
unintelligible; and some observers question whether true diversity can
be accomplished without paternalistic governmental intervention.224
Whatever the merits of these arguments, the laissez-faire approach to
the marketplace of ideas remains the dominant paradigm for regulat-
220 Id.
221 Id. at 340.
222 Id.
223 Keyishian v. Rd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting Unites States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). Pre-
sumably, diversity in the marketplace of ideas maximizes the choices available to con-
sumers. See Browne et al., supra note 196, at 433 (pointing out that this same
assumption-of "social benefit emerging from a vigorous clash of interests"-under-
lies the jury system).
224 See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH XVii-XX,
18-19 (1993). Diversity is thwarted when powerful media corporations "set the
parameters of public debate." FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 193, at 11. Moreover,
"[mlany citizens are barred from meaningful participation in the marketplace of
ideas by poverty or inadequate education, and class, race, or gender may impair the
ability of some speakers to make their voices heard." Id.
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ing the print media, including the Internet. 22 -5 The laissez-faire
approach reflects both the strength of our national commitment to
democratic self-governance as well as our distrust of governmental
intervention.2 26 Respect for the autonomy of citizens demands that
they be allowed to consider all available information in deciding what
course to follow. And they must be free to make these choices without
governmental intervention, for such intervention "would necessarily
circumscribe the potential for collective self-determination." 227 Even
if a benign moderator might improve the quality of public discourse,
American constitutional theory normally bars the state from playing
that role (and rightly so). If history proves anything, it proves that
distrust of governmental intervention in the marketplace of ideas is
warranted, for governmental attempts to "prescribe what shall be
orthodox" 228 have resulted frequently in suppression of truth and
enshrinement of error.22 9
In recognition of this fact, First Amendment jurisprudence has
committed to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public discourse,
even at the expense of tolerating some degree of false and abusive
speech. Early on, James Madison recognized that "[s]ome degree of
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no
instance is this more true than in that of the press."230 Explicitly
225 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (applying this approach to regulation
of Internet speech). Broadcasting is subject to far more government controls due to
spectrum scarcity. See generally Mehmet Konar-Steenberg, The Needle and the Damage
Done: The Pervasive Presence of Obsolete Mass Media Audience Models in First Amendment
Doctrine, 8 VAND.J. Errr. & TECH. L. 45, 46 (2005) (decrying paternalistic regulation of
broadcast media as inconsistent with empirical research on audience behavior); Ron-
aldJ. Krotoszynski,Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power,
Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 813, 873 ("[1]f the owner-
ship of local media outlets is centralized among a few owners, the dangers of self-
serving and, perhaps, antidemocratic, behavior loom much larger.").
226 As Alexander Meiklejohn eloquently wrote, "[w] hen men govern themselves, it
is they-and no one else-who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness
and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise
ones . . . ." MEIKLEJOH-N, supra note 174, at 26.
227 Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1118 (1993); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as
a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 40 (1975) (observing
that the "state lacks 'moderators' who can be trusted to know when 'everything worth
saying' has been said").
228 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
229 For eloquent expression of this idea, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH
81-86 (1982).
230 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
571 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1876)).
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adopting Madison's philosophy, the Supreme Court in New York Times
refused to punish even negligent "erroneous statement[s] ";231 the
Court realized that errors are "inevitable in free debate" in order to
ensure that "freedoms of expression . . .have the 'breathing space'
that they 'need ... to survive." 232 This landmark decision, like many
others, opts for underregulation of potentially harmful speech lest
protected speech be chilled. In other words, more speech is better
than less speech, and a more diverse public discourse must sometimes
be bought at the expense of a less civilized one.
C. Implications
These First Amendment assumptions are directly relevant to eval-
uating the contribution anonymous speech makes to public discourse
and to deciding how that contribution is to be weighed against other
important rights. Any regulation of anonymous speech should begin
with the presumption that information consumers are likely to dis-
count unattributed speech and to use indicia other than author iden-
tity to judge its reliability. In other words, regulation of anonymous
speech should start with the assumption that the audience itself will
be able to dissipate much of the harm of anonymous speech.233
Another implication is that anonymous speech is, presumptively, valu-
able speech. While First Amendment jurisprudence might prefer
attributed speech to anonymous speech, it clearly prefers anonymous
speech to no speech at all, especially when audiences can exercise
"self-help" to minimize the perils of anonymous speech. 234 This is not
231 Id. at 271-72.
232 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
233 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the heart of
the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.
Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal."). Certainly we can and
sometimes do make different assumptions about the citizenry as information consum-
ers. For example, regulation of the speech of issuers of securities is explicitly pre-
mised on paternalism. As the Supreme Court noted, writing specifically about so-
called "blue sky" laws: "Such laws are to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsus-
pecting, and the gullible from the exercise of their own volition." Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973). Yet to make such paternalistic assumptions as a
general matter, especially when applied to core speech, is fundamentally antithetical
to democratic theory.
234 This argument is sometimes made in support of giving reporters a privilege to
protect confidential sources of information. The reporter's privilege increases the
overall quantity and quality of speech that the public receives, and it encourages
speakers to come forward when they might otherwise remain silent. However, there is
one key difference between the argument for a reporter's privilege and the argument
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to say that all audience members will be intelligent, sophisticated, crit-
ical readers; indeed, many audience members will not be capable of
the rationalism that is an article of faith in much First Amendment
jurisprudence. Even so, both democratic theory and First Amend-
ment jurisprudence are deeply committed to respecting citizens'
autonomy and capacity for self-governance, and this commitment dic-
tates a rationalist account of audience response to core speech rather
than a paternalistic one.235 AsJustice Potter Stewart eloquently wrote,
"[e] nlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon
which an open society is premised."236
IV. COPING WITH ANONYMOUS SPEECH: A GUIDE FOR
LEGISLATORS AND COURTS
The cost-benefit and constitutional analyses presented here have
important practical implications for both legislatures and courts.
Lawmakers who rely solely on the cost-benefit analysis might rationally
decide that anonymous speech is more trouble than it is worth,
despite its many benefits. But the First Amendment analysis tips the
balance. This Part provides guidance to legislatures about what types
of situations might justify statutes compelling disclosure of author
identity. We also argue that legislatures and courts should recognize a
privilege to speak anonymously in cases involving political or other
for a privilege to speak anonymously or pseudonymously, namely, that the reporter
who receives the information presumably knows the identity of the source and there-
fore vouches for its reliability.
235 Several theorists have focused on the importance of public discourse as a com-
ponent of democracy. Robert Post, for example, quotes John Dewey for the proposi-
tion that "democracy begins in conversation," and Post's own theory focuses on how
Supreme Court decisions have made "public discourse" a central facet of our constitu-
tional system. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 185-87 (1995) (quoting
DIALOGUE ON JOHN DEwEY 58 (Corliss Lamont ed., 1959)). Similarly, Robert Bennett
has proposed a "conversational model" to describe "the actual functioning of democ-
racy in the United States." Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of
Difficulty, 95 Nw. U. L. Ruv. 845, 871 (2001). Under this model, "an important influ-
ence in producing a sense on the part of citizens of involvement in the processes of
government-and thence of fidelity to its decisions-is its pervasive tendency to
direct conversation about public affairs their way." Id. Bennett concedes that the
discourse that results is not necessarily "enlightened or high-minded," id. at 872, but
his theory demands that citizens be capable of meaningful "engagement" in "ongoing
public conversation." See Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Coversation, 14
CONST. COMMENr. 481, 481 (1997).
236 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 (1972) (Stewart,J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the press promotes citizens' ability to make enlightened choices).
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core speech; a privilege that can only be overcome upon an exacting
showing of need by either the State or private litigants.2 7
A. When Should the State Mandate Disclosure?
Congress recently passed legislation criminalizing threatening,
harassing or "annoying" online anonymous speech.2 38 This patently
unconstitutional 39 statute is not the first or only legislative attempt to
quell online anonymous speech. 240 Nor will it be the last. Hence,
both legislators and their critics can benefit from the insights that this
analysis yields.
The first, and perhaps most obvious, insight is that legislatures
should not regulate anonymous speech in the literary, artistic or polit-
ical realms, absent a compelling need for the regulation beyond sim-
ply providing the audience with more information. More specifically,
237 Of course, context can be crucial. Our focus remains centered principally on
anonymous speech as it relates to political campaigns and to torts such as defamation
and infringement. Other contexts may be quite different. As we noted above, for
example, in the context of civil litigation, courts occasionally permit parties to appear
anonymously, but there is certainly no presumption in favor of anonymous litigation.
See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993) (listing factors that a court
should consider before allowing a party to proceed as a "Doe" defendant). In the
context of criminal litigation, courts rarely permit the State to withhold a testifying
witness's identity, taking into account the centrality of the witness to the prosecution
or defense case and the danger to the witness's safety. See, e.g., United States v.
Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (lth Cir. 1982); Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d
203, 223 (Cal. 2000). In such instances, constitutional guarantees of due process or
the right to confront one's accusers normally give rise to a presumption against ano-
nymity. Similarly, we express no general views in this paper, though we may in future
work, on the constitutionality of "antimask" laws that forbid people from disguising
their identities in public places. These laws may chill some speech but may conceiva-
bly be justified as anti-intimidation measures. Compare Church of the Am. Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding an antimask
law constitutional), with Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F.
Supp. 2d 835, 840-42 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (declaring a similar law unconstitutional).
238 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223
(West 2006)) (purporting to restrict anonymous Internet communications made with
"intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person . . . who receives the
communication").
239 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[O]ne man's vulgarity is
another's lyric."); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) ("Conduct
that annoys some people does not annoy others.").
240 See, e.g., Assemb. 1327, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006), available at: http://
www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A1500/1327_12.PDF; see ACLU v. Miller, 977 F.
Supp. 1228, 1234 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (striking down Georgia law forbidding Internet
users from falsely identifying themselves).
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legislatures should not regulate types of speech in which 
(a) speakers
have high autonomy interests (such as literary or artistic speech), 
(b)
the potential for abuse is relatively low, and (c) a rational audience
exists with the ability to protect itself from potential 
harms. Consider-
ation of these factors will not obviate making hard 
choices between
competing interests in all cases, but it will facilitate 
analysis of whether
compelled disclosure is practically or constitutionally 
warranted.
As an illustration, reconsider the example of anonymous 
book
reviews. Whatever the merits of Schopenhauer's 
criticisms of anony-
mous reviewers, it would be unwise and unconstitutional 
to criminal-
ize anonymous book reviews. The speaker's autonomy 
interest in
making aesthetic judgments is high, aesthetic judgments are notori-
ously subjective, and a rational audience is likely to discount anony-
mous reviews. If, for example, a reader wants to 
buy a copy of Milan
Kundera's The Unbearable Lightness of Being from Amazon.com, she 
will
find 212 customer reviews on the book's web 
page. As far as the
reader is concerned, these reviewers are anonymous, 
even when they
include their real names. She has no reason to credit 
their aesthetic
judgments apart from the persuasiveness of their writing. It is unlikely
that any single review will influence her purchasing 
decision, and the
potential for damage from any one review (say, one which abuses 
its
anonymity) is mitigated by the presence of numerous 
other entries.2 41
She almost certainly will not read all 212 reviews, 
but the reviews in
the aggregate provide information about the popular 
opinion of
Kundera's book; if she generally hews to popular opinion, 
the reviews
may determine whether she purchases the book.
This is not to say that anonymous 
reviews are always harmless.
242
Naive readers may give anonymous reviews undue 
credit, and in this
case an anonymous reviewer could successfully 
abuse the right to
speak anonymously by skewering a rival's book 
that he secretly
admires. Even though this behavior is boorish, 
it would unduly
infringe speaker autonomy to criminalize it, 
especially where a
rational audience will discount the review as the 
subjective opinion of
241 Quixotically, virulent negative reviews might make 
the reader more likely to
purchase. Consider the case of a highly controversial 
political author whose reviews
garner countless emotional tirades from opponents, 
making the book more desirable
in the eyes of a fan who enjoys the author's controversial qualities.
242 A prankster, masquerading as "Andrew Lloyd 
Webber," posted near-defama-
tory book reviews on Amazon.com. John Schwartz, 
Who's Composing All Those Fake
Online Reviews?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 2001, at C4 
("[F]alse Lloyd Webber endorse-
ments went to guidebooks on combating halitosis 
and premature ejaculation. ...
Many of the reviews were not fit to print in this 
newspaper and might qualify as
libelous if not for the latitude that the law affords 
to obvious parodies.").
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someone whose motives and biases are unknown. Moreover, legal
remedies are available to pursue the speaker who crosses the line into
making false and defamatory factual assertions. A statute compelling
disclosure is simply too blunt an instrument to regulate anonymous
"core" speech that poses a low risk of harm when rationally
discounted.
A corollary, however, is that the State should have authority to
compel speakers to disclose their identities to their audiences when
the speakers' autonomy interests are particularly low and the potential
for abuse particularly high. Thus, nothing in our analysis would pre-
vent legislatures from regulating anonymous unsolicited commercial
e-mail, or "spare." Estimates suggest that thirteen million spare are
sent each day,243 many of them pseudonymously. The sender of the e-
mail is motivated by financial self-interest rather than self-fulfillment,
and the potential for fraud is high.244 Even though most rational
audience members can protect themselves from fraudulent anony-
mous spare (if not from annoying anonymous spam), First Amend-
ment jurisprudence specifically allows for a limited degree of
paternalistic regulation of commercial (as opposed to core) speech.245
What, then, should legislators do in the realm of electoral
speech? Anonymous speech during election campaigns is largely
political speech, and yet the Supreme Court's electoral speech juris-
prudence occasionally allows paternalistic regulation in the name of
ensuring an informed citizenry.2 46 As we saw in Part I, the compelled
disclosure provisions in McConnell rest in part on the assumption that
voters will not be able to perceive partisan bias in election advertise-
ments, at least when the advertisements are run immediately before
an election. And yet the Supreme Court in Mills v. Alabama2 47 struck
down a law that made it a crime for a newspaper to publish editorials
for or against a ballot measure on election day, even though the pur-
pose of the law was to protect voters from "confusive last-minute
243 SeeJameel Harb, Note, White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. University of Texas at
Austin: The CAN-SPAM Act & the Limitations of Legislative Spam Controls, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 531, 532 (2006).
244 Nigerian- banking con schemes and e-mail viruses are common examples of
spain-based fraud, and both should probably be familiar to anyone who has been
using electronic mail for any length of time.
245 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 562-64 (1980). But see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556-70
(2001).
246 See Levine, supra note 84, at 253-56 (discussing this paternalistic strain in elec-
toral speech jurisprudence).
247 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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charges and countercharges." 24 s Mills refused to allow the state to
criminalize election-day editorials as a means of preventing voter con-
fusion; paternalism simply could not justify such an "obvious and fla-
grant abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the
press."2
49
Although detailing the problems with the Court's electoral
speech jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article, our norma-
tive analysis suggests that restrictions on political speech, even in the
electoral context (or especially in the electoral context), should not
be based on paternalistic assumptions about voters. Thus, the rele-
vant question both for lawmakers and for courts ought to be whether
a compelled disclosure law can be justified without reference to pater-
nalism. Reconsider the compelled disclosure provision in McCon-
nell.2 -5 0 It was not motivated solely by the desire to protect the
audience from being misled by clever partisans.251 It was also moti-
vated by the desire to prevent corporations and unions from circum-
venting contribution limits and to prevent politicians from being
corrupted. Our analysis does not undermine the legitimacy or weight-
iness of these concerns, but instead indicates that they should be eval-
uated standing alone, without the added weight of paternalistic
assumptions about voters to bolster them.2 52
248 Id. at 219. The law made it a crime to solicit votes for or against a ballot pro-
position on election day, and the editor of the Birmingham Post-Herald was arrested
for violating it after his newspaper carried an election-day editorial urging voters to
adopt a mayor-council form of government. Id. at 215-16.
249 Id. at 219. In theory the arguments made against paternalistic regulation
should apply equally to broadcasting, but the Supreme Court has tolerated regulation
to achieve broadcast "fairness" due to the fact that the broadcast spectrum is a scarce
resource not available to all citizens. This sort of paternalistic regulation is reflected
in a 2005 FCC order directing broadcasters and cable operators to disclose the
"nature, source, and sponsorship" of "prepackaged news stores" or face up to a
$10,000 fine and/or a year in jail. See Frank Ahrens, Broadcasters Must Reveal Video
Clips' Sources, FCC Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2005, at A2.
250 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003).
251 Voters certainly do not need to know the identity of the speaker to understand
that a purported issue ad that ended with the message "Contact Senators Feingold
and Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster" of President Bush's judicial nomi-
nees is really a partisan ad aimed at defeating Feingold's bid for reelection. See Wis.
Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1260, 2004 WL 3622736, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 17,
2004), vacated by 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
252 The overall vitality of the regulatory scheme upheld in McConnell, 540 U.S. at
246, is already being called into question by the Supreme Court, albeit indirectly. See
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492-94 (2006); Wis. Right to Life, 546 U.S. at
411-12.
A more difficult illustration is presented by the anonymous speech regulation in
Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2005). A "literature policy" at the
1593
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. Balancing Anonymous Speech Rights in Torts Cases
In the last ten years, courts have found themselves adjudicating
more disputes pitting the rights of anonymous speakers against the
rights of those allegedly harmed by their speech. The typical case
begins with the aggrieved plaintiff bringing suit against a 'John Doe"
for anonymously publishing defamation, perpetrating fraud, divulging
trade secrets, or violating the plaintiffs copyright-all on the
Internet.253 The plaintiff files suit, then subpoenas "John Doe's" ISP
University of Texas required all printed materials distributed on campus, regardless of
subject matter, to contain the name of a University-affiliated person or group respon-
sible for distribution. Id. at 763. One of the University's justifications for restricting
anonymous leafleting was to "preserve the campus for use by students, faculty, and
staff' by excluding "non-affiliated" speakers from distributing literature on campus.
Id. at 764. An anti-abortion student group contended that the literature policy
abridged its First Amendment right of anonymous speech, and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed. Id. at 763. The court recognized anonymous speech on university
campuses as an important means of expressing "controversial ideas." Id. at 765. In
other words, the court acknowledged the strong autonomy interests of students in
speaking anonymously on campus. However, the case was complicated by the fact
that university campuses are not open to the public; the court therefore had to parse
public forum jurisprudence before concluding that the area affected by the literature
policy was a designated public forum. Id. at 766-69. As regulation of speech in a
public forum, the literature policy had to pass "strict scrutiny," at least the version
applicable to content neutral regulations. It failed. Id. at 769-71. Although the
court acknowledged that the University's interest in "preserving the campus for stu-
dent use" was significant, it held that the literature policy was not narrowly tailored to
advance that interest. Id. at 769. Although the literature policy affected only leaflets
and not other forms of anonymous speech, the court still concluded that it placed an
inordinate burden on anonymous speech because it "require[d] the speaker to iden-
tify himself, not just to certain University officials, but to every person who receives the
literature being distributed." Id. at 771. The court then suggested that lesser restric-
tions on anonymous speech, such as requiring a registered student to notify university
officials before distributing leaflets, might be narrowly enough tailored to survive
strict scrutiny. Id. Although the court's decision reached ajustifiable conclusion, our
positive analysis points out a significant factor that the court's decision overlooked.
The regulation was not aimed at protecting the audience from any harm that would
flow from the anonymous speech; rather, it was aimed at protecting them from the
secondary effects of speech, namely the presence of "unauthorized" anonymous
speakers who might displace authorized speakers from the university campus.
253 See cases cited infra note 255; see also Lidsky, supra note 10, at 858 n.6 (listing
numerous libel cases brought against pseudonymous Internet speakers between 1995
and 2000). For commentary on this phenomenon, see Victoria Smith Ekstrand,
Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. &
PoL'v 405, 407 (2003); David L. Sobel, The Process that "John Doe" is Due: Addressing the
Legal Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA.J.L. & TECH. 3, 1-2 (2000), http://www.
vjolt.net/vol5/symposium/v5ila3-Sobel.html; Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits
and John Doe Subpoenas, 19J. MARSHAILLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493 (2001); Michael S.
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to reveal his true identity. If John Doe is lucky, his ISP notifies him
and he is able to file a motion to quash the subpoena. At that point, a
court must decide whether and how to balance the plaintiffs right to
proceed in tort with the defendant's right to speak anonymously. If
all it takes is an allegation of defamation to uncover a defendant's
identity, the right to speak anonymously is very fragile indeed, because
it is easy for a plaintiff to allege defamation any time he comes in for
harsh criticism online.254 On the other hand, anonymity should not
immunize the defendant's tortious conduct. How, then, is a judge to
adjudicate the dispute?
Some courts have simply found the anonymous speaker's rights
unworthy of protection once the plaintiff has alleged the speech is
tortious.2 55 More commonly, though, courts have struggled to bal-
ance the rights of plaintiffs and defendants, adopting a variety of dif-
ferent standards to the task.256 The most noteworthy recent decision
Vogel, Unmasking "John Doe" Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over
Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REv. 795, 803-15 (2004); Jennifer O'Brien, Note, Putting a
Face to a (Screen) Name, 70 FoRHAM L. REv. 2745, 2753-58 (2002).
254 The lawsuits are not frivolous merely because they are brought to silence the
defendant. Defamation suits are almost always aimed at "silencing the defendant, and
from the standpoint of traditional First Amendment law, there is no harm in silencing
knowingly or recklessly false statements of fact, for these statements have no value to
public discourse." See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 860.
255 See, e.g., Court Order at 1-2, Hvide v. John Does I Through 8, No. 99-22831
(Fla. Cir. Ct. May 25, 2000) (on file with author, who was acting as counsel for the
Does at the hearing in which the judge made this statement) (comparing anonymous
speakers to hooded Ku Klux Klan members); Vogel, supra note 253, at 803 & n.39
(citing Court Order, supra, at 1-2; Court Order at 1-2, Biomatrix, Inc. v. Doe I, No.
BER-L-70-00 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 28, 2000); In re Imperial Sugar Co., No.
2000-33782 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 21, 2000)) (finding that these cases "contained little if
any analysis of the competing interests").
256 In addition to the copyright infringement cases cited supra at notes 110-19,
some of the more noteworthy attempts to develop protections for anonymous speech
include Doe v. 2TheMart, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Colum-
bia Insurance Co. v, Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Doe v.
Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457-58 (Del. 2005) (adopting "summary judgment" standard);
Dendrite International v. Does, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(adopting a four-part balancing test); Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis.
2006) (holding that under Wisconsin law a trial court should decide a pending
motion to dismiss a defamation claim before compelling disclosure of the identities of
anonymous speakers). But see Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 46-50 (Pa. 2003) (not
articulating a clear standard); Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA
Dev., Inc., No. 0425, 2006 WL 37020, at *8-9 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Jan. 4, 2006) (conclud-
ing that ordinary discovery processes were sufficient to balance the relevant interests).
A Virginia statute gives procedural protections to anonymous Internet speakers
alleged to have committed torts. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (Supp. 2006).
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of this second type is Doe v. Cahill,25 7 which serves as a good point of
departure for developing a uniform framework, whether statutory or
judicial, to protect the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. In
Cahill the plaintiffs filed suit against a 'John Doe" defendant for defa-
mation and invasion of privacy. 25s Writing under the pseudonym
"Proud Citizen," the defendant criticized plaintiff Cahill's perform-
ance as a city councilman on a website devoted to discussion of local
politics.2 59 Plaintiffs complained that two postings in particular were
defamatory. The first praised the local mayor and called Cahill, in
contrast, "a divisive impediment to any kind of cooperative move-
ment," asserting that "[a]nyone who has spent any amount of time
with Cahill would be keenly aware of such character flaws, not to men-
tion an obvious mental deterioration. 260 The other posting again
praised the mayor and stated "Gahill [sic] is as paranoid as everyone
in the town thinks he is."261 Plaintiffs obtained a court order requir-
ing Doe's ISP to disclose his identity. The provider notified Doe, who
filed a motion to prevent disclosure, which the judge denied on the
ground that plaintiffs had a good faith basis for their tort claims.262
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found the good faith
standard to be insufficiently protective of anonymous speakers' First
Amendment rights. 263 Instead, the Court, faced with "an entire spec-
trum of 'standards' that could be required," 26 4 held that plaintiffs
must meet a "summary judgment standard" before piercing a defen-
dant's anonymity. Under this standard a plaintiff must: (1) provide
notice to the anonymous poster, to the extent possible, that his iden-
tity is being sought and allow defendant a reasonable opportunity to
respond;265 (2) establish the prima facie elements of his claim suffi-
ciently to avoid summary judgment.2 66 The court believed that no
explicit balancing of interests was necessary, since balancing was
257 884 A.2d 451.
258 Plaintiff councilman and his wife originally filed suit against four John Doe
defendants. Only one defendant appealed. See id. at 454.
259 The court also referred to it as a blog. Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 The trial judge determined that, in order to obtain disclosure of Doe's identity,
the plaintiffs had to establish a "good faith basis" for their claims, that the identity was
"directly and materially related to their claim," and "that the information could not
be obtained from any other source." Id. at 455.
263 Id. at 457.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 460-61.
266 Id. at 461.
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already entailed in the application of the summary judgment
standard.26 7
The Delaware Supreme Court was careful to tailor the summary
judgment standard to the defamation context, requiring the plaintiff
to "introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact" only
for those elements "within the plaintiff's control."268 What that meant in
Cahill was that the plaintiff, a public figure, had to produce prima
facie evidence that the defendant published a false and defamatory
statement concerning him to a third party; once plaintiff established
these elements, the court would compel disclosure to allow plaintiff to
establish the remaining element of his claim, namely that the defen-
dant made the statement with knowledge or reckless disregard of its
falsity (that is, with actual malice). The court believed this standard
fairly balanced the plaintiffs and defendant's interests since plaintiff
had "easy access to proof' of all of these elements except for actual
malice, which hinges on the defendant's state of mind.2 69
Applying this standard, the court concluded that no reasonable
person would interpret the substitution of a "G" for the "C" in "Cahill"
as an indication that Mr. Cahill had a same-sex affair. 270 Nor would it
conclude that Cahill was mentally ill. The "Gahill" statement was
more likely a typo than a homosexual slur, and the paranoia allega-
tion was merely a statement of opinion rather than an assertion of
fact.27 1 The court based this determination in part on how "reasona-
ble readers" decode anonymous messages on Internet websites or
blogs. Such readers take their cues from context and "are unlikely to
view messages posted anonymously as assertions of fact,"2 7 2 especially
when they appear on websites filled with invective and hyperbole.2 73
The Court pointed out that the website's guidelines stated that it was
devoted to "opinions" about local politics. Moreover, at least one
reader of Doe's postings responded that "'your tone and choice of
words is [that of] a type of person that couldn't convince me. You
sound like the person with all the anger and hate . "274 Read in
267 Id.
268 Id. at 463.
269 Id. at 463-64. The court stressed that the first element-which requires courts
to determine whether a statement contains factual assertions that are capable of a
defamatory meaning-is "perhaps the most important" in establishing the legitimacy
of a plaintiffs claim. Id. at 463.
270 Id. at 467.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 465 (quoting Rocker Mgmt., LLC v. John Does 1 Through 20, No. 03-
MG-33, 2003 WL 22149380, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2003)).
273 Id.
274 Id. at 467.
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context, Doe's statements were "incapable of a defamatory mean-
ing."2 75 The court therefore held that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the
summary judgment standard necessary to obtain Doe's true identity.
The Delaware Supreme Court's approach in Cahill is broadly con-
sistent with the kind of balancing this Article advocates. However, it is
the first decision on this issue by a state's high court, and it adds yet
another standard to the "spectrum" available to any court or legisla-
ture searching for a workable solution. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
lay out the steps in a workable solution in the hope that a uniform
standard will evolve from the current morass. This uniform standard
could be enacted by legislators or adopted by courts. The compo-
nents of an ideal standard are as follows.
1. Notice to the Anonymous Speaker
The first component is a requirement that anonymous speakers
be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. A speaker cannot
defend her right to speak anonymously unless she receives notice that
her identity is being sought in a civil or criminal action and she is
given an opportunity to come forward to assert her rights. Obviously,
the notice requirement cannot be applied too stringently when the
defendant's identity is unknown. In the Internet context, it is reason-
able to require the plaintiff to post notice on the same website, blog,
chat room, or other forum where the defendant's allegedly tortious
communication was made. Moreover, since plaintiff will ordinarily
seek the defendant's identity from an ISP, it is logical to require the
ISP to give notice to its subscriber before disclosing the subscriber's
identity. The Cable Communications Policy Act places such a burden
on operators of cable systems that provide internet service, 2 76 but
these requirements should be extended to cover other claims as well
to help guarantee the defendant has a chance to defend his right to
speak anonymously before it is too late.
275 Id.
276 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 2, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat.
2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2000)). The Cable Communications Policy Act
prohibits the dissemination of subscriber data by operators of cable systems without
consent, unless the disclosure is necessary to render service or if it is made to a gov-
ernment entity pursuant to court order, in which case the subscriber must be notified
of the order and given an opportunity to prohibit or limit the disclosure. Id. This act
was subsequently modified by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act of 1992 § 20, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). See Fitch v. Doe, 869 A.2d 722, 725-27
(Me. 2005) (noting that the trial court erred in ruling a subscriber had consented to
disclosure; under 47 U.S.C. § 551 (c) (2) (B), the ISP could release such information to
a nongovernmental entity in response to court order if it notified the subscriber).
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2. Applying a Qualified Privilege to Speak Anonymously
Once the anonymous speaker challenges disclosure of his or her
identity, a court must step in to determine whether the speaker
enjoyed a privilege to speak anonymously and, if so, whether the
plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to overcome that privilege.
As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether the speech
at issue is core First Amendment speech, as defined (broadly) by
Supreme Court precedent.2 77 If the anonymous speech at issue is
core speech, the qualified right to speak anonymously acts as a privi-
lege to protect the anonymous speaker's identity from automatic
disclosure.278
Although the process we advocate here differs little from the pro-
cess applied in Cahill, it is nonetheless useful to describe the process
in terms of privilege law. Privilege concepts are familiar to both First
Amendment law and tort law.2 7 9 A variety of First Amendment and
277 Defining core First Amendment speech creates troublesome issues at the mar-
gins, but it is clear, at a minimum, that core speech includes discussions of political,
literary, artistic, historical, cultural and social concerns. See generally Harry Kalven,Jr.,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964
Sup. CT. REv. 191, 208 ("The Amendment has a 'central meaning'-a core of protec-
tion of speech without which democracy cannot function, without which, in
Madison's phrase, 'the censorial power' would be in the Government over the people
and not 'in the people over the Government."').
278 As for the copyright infringement cases involving the file sharing of recorded
music, we suggested above that the act of file sharing is partially expressive, even if it is
also (perhaps predominantly) conduct to which the expression is incidental. See
supra Part ILB.4. We therefore tend to agree with those courts that have required
plaintiffs to overcome the presumption of anonymity with, inter alia, specific support-
ing evidence that the file sharer has downloaded copyrighted material. See supra
notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
279 The "reporter's privilege" to shield confidential sources is probably the most
familiar. Depending on the jurisdiction, the basis for any applicable "reporter's privi-
lege" may be a statute, a state constitution, common law, or possibly the First Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution. See FANKLIN ET AL., supra note 193, at 577 (discussing
sources of reporter's privilege). The Supreme Court has never recognized a
reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment, but many lower courts have inter-
preted the Court's unusual and enigmatic decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), "as creating a federal constitutional privilege." FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note
193, at 575. In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does
not shield reporters from having to testify before grand juries about information
obtained from confidential sources. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. Branzburg was a 5-4
decision, but Justice Powell, who joined the majority opinion, wrote a separate con-
currence emphasizing how "limited" the majority decision was and suggesting that he
would extend reporters a testimonial privilege in some circumstances. Id. at 709-10
(Powell, J., concurring). The irony of Branzburg is that Justice Powell's concurrence
ultimately lent weight to the dissenting Justices' contention that the First Amendment
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tort privileges attempt to balance competing interests in ways that fos-
ter open discussion and debate.280 Sullivan, the most famous First
Amendment case of the twentieth century, is often described as creat-
ing a constitutional privilege to criticize public officials; a plaintiff can
overcome the privilege by showing that the defendant's speech was
false and made with actual malice. And courts have developed a num-
ber of qualified privileges, such as the privilege to fairly and accurately
report information in an open public record, to protect public discus-
sion from suffering the chilling effects of defamation liability. One
virtue of describing the right to speak anonymously in this familiar
way is that it suggests at the outset that the right is not absolute but
must be balanced against plaintiffs' interests in order to foster unin-
hibited public discourse. Moreover, it suggests the relevant mecha-
nism for balancing: Once the privilege applies, it creates something in
the nature of a presumption that the defendant's identity is protected
and places the burden on the plaintiff to overcome it by establishing,
in essence, the legitimacy of her need for disclosure.281
3. Overcoming the Privilege
In order to overcome the privilege to speak anonymously, a plain-
tiff should be required to provide prima facie evidence to support
those elements of plaintiffs claim that are within plaintiff's control.
In other words, the plaintiff must provide prima facie evidence of ele-
ments that are not dependent on defendant's identity, like the defam-
atory nature of the communication, publication, and identification.
By helping to guarantee the legitimacy of plaintiff's claim, this
requirement ameliorates the threat that plaintiffs will bring claims
merely to silence or retaliate against those who criticize them. Moreo-
ver, it strikes a proper balance between the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants. The plaintiff is able to uncover the defendant's identity,
but only when she shows the identity is necessary for the plaintiff to
creates a qualified privilege for reporters who are subpoenaed to appear before grand
juries. See id. at 736 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart later suggested that con-
sidering Powell's concurrence, Branzburg could be characterized as rejecting the
reporters' claim of privilege by a vote of "four and a half to four and a half." Potter
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975).
280 See FRA.LIN ET AL., supra note 193, at 259-62 (discussing common law privi-
leges that apply in defamation actions).
281 Michael Vogel is correct in asserting that existing procedural rules could be
used to protect the right to speak anonymously. See Vogel, supra note 253, at 823.
But a formal mechanism for protecting the right, such as the privilege we advocate
here, focuses attention on the significance of the right and guides the balancing that
is to take place, thereby increasing predictability.
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pursue her claim. The burden of producing prima facie evidence of
the elements of her claim is one that the plaintiff must bear anyway;
all that this requirement does is to require this evidence be produced
at the outset, prior to disclosure of defendant's identity. Cahill
demonstrated how such a burden could be met by defamation
plaintiffs.
Although defamation is the most common tort brought against
anonymous speakers, there is no practical reason why the same
approach could not be taken to other types of tort cases involving
expressive speech. For example, a plaintiff alleging misappropriation
of a trade secret by an anonymous defendant should be required to
produce evidence tending to show that the information disclosed was
indeed a trade secret. 28 2 Establishing this element does not require
defendant's identity, and it serves as an indicium of the genuineness
of plaintiffs claim. Once established, the plaintiff should be able to
obtain defendant's identity to establish misappropriation, which
depends on the status and mental state of the defendant. This same
approach can and should be applied to other tort claims brought
based on anonymous speech.
4. Balancing Harms
One final component should be added to the privilege analysis.
If a plaintiff is able to overcome the defendant's privilege to speak
anonymously, the defendant should have a final opportunity to con-
vince the judge, in camera, that the magnitude of harm she faces if
her identity is revealed outweighs the plaintiffs need for her identity.
Only at this point would a court need to consider the speaker's actual
motive (e.g., fear of death) and, if necessary, to engage in the difficult
task of weighing the competing interests. 283 Although a defendant
would rarely be able to establish a threat of sufficient magnitude to
282 A trade secret can be any information that "derives independent economic
value . . .from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use," and is subject to "efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to main-
tain its secrecy." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538
(2005). As with copyright infringement, however, there may be a preliminary ques-
tion of whether the act of using or disclosing an alleged trade secret is expressive
speech or merely conduct. For a recent discussion of the occasional tensions between
First Amendment law and trade secret law, see Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolv-
ing Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Public
Law Research Paper No. 925056, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925056.
283 But cf. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579-80 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
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outweigh plaintiffs need for defendant's identity, this last component
of the privilege analysis serves as a final piece 
of insurance that defen-
dant's right to speak anonymously is not too lightly 
compromised.
CONCLUSION
Judge Learned Hand once famously wrote that "the 
First Amend-
ment . .. presupposes that right conclusions 
are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than 
through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and 
always will be, folly; but
we have staked upon it our all."
284 As Judge Hand recognized, democ-
racy rests on our faith in citizens' ability to 
decide for themselves
where truth lies in public discourse. This same 
faith underlies the
Supreme Court's recognition of a First Amendment 
right to speak
anonymously. The Court's anonymous speech 
decisions manifest a
faith, albeit one that wavers at times, in citizens' 
ability to discount
anonymous information and protect themselves 
from its harms, at
least in most cases. This faith is being challenged 
by the Internet-
fueled growth of anonymous speech. Legislators 
increasingly seek to
curb anonymous speech in the name of protecting 
citizens from
harm, and courts increasingly must adjudicate tort claims 
against
anonymous speakers. Both legislatures and 
courts need guidance in
dealing with these issues that the Supreme Court 
has failed to provide.
This Article provides that guidance. We provide 
a positive analy-
sis of the motivations, both good and bad, of 
anonymous speakers.
Our positive analysis is supported by recent scholarship 
on the trade-
mark function of authorship, which we use 
to show how audiences
infer the motivations of authors and thereby 
decode anonymous
speech. Even so, our positive analysis fails 
to show that anonymous
speech, on balance, produces more social good 
than social harm.
We therefore turn to First Amendment jurisprudence and 
demo-
cratic theory to provide a normative basis for 
protecting anonymous
speech and to provide guidance on how to 
balance it against other
important rights. These sources largely forbid 
paternalistic regulation
of anonymous speech concerning matters 
at the core of the First
Amendment, and they suggest that the first line 
of defense against the
threat posed by anonymous speech 
is audience "self-help."
28 5
Ultimately, therefore, we caution legislators 
against passing legis-
lation compelling authors to disclose their identities 
in the name of
providing audiences more information: Compelled 
disclosure cannot
284 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. 
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd,
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
285 See supra Part III.A.
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be justified absent a compelling need for author identity, at least in
the realm of core speech. We also advocate that legislatures enact or
courts adopt an evidentiary privilege to safeguard the right to speak
anonymously from the chilling effect of "cyberSLAPPs." Adoption of
the privilege would bring a uniform approach to the vexing problem
of balancing the rights of anonymous speakers with the rights of those
harmed by their speech.
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